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Abstract  
This thesis proposes that the adoption of the phenomenological perspective has potential to 
cultivate a uniquely rich sort of self-understanding in women throughout pregnancy and early 
motherhood. I argue that contemporary reductionist theories of consciousness in both 
philosophy and psychiatry fail to recognise the irreducibility of the subject, and in turn, the 
relationship between mind, body, and world. From this, I defend the adoption of a moderately 
naturalised phenomenological perspective on changes to the structure of experience in 
pregnancy. I then offer an analysis of the phenomenology of pregnancy and early 
motherhood, working with existing literature on the phenomenology of illness, with 
particular focus on depression. I explore some factors that might influence certain women’s 
vulnerability to depression-like experience in pregnancy, proposing that for such vulnerable 
individuals, the way in which experience can alter in pregnancy can involve 
phenomenologically-rich structural similarities to the ways in which experience can alter in 
illness. Finally, I argue that the dominance of the reductionist paradigm that I resisted results 
in various types of epistemic injustices being committed against such women in the clinical 
encounter. From this, I suggest how the adoption of the phenomenological perspective might 
work to mitigate the effects of these injustices, facilitating self-understanding and resilience 
in the women in question.  
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Introduction 
I begin by discussing problems with the standard conceptions of consciousness in both 
philosophy and psychiatry. I show how these conceptions are leading both disciplines down a 
dark path in their efforts to understand consciousness and place it in a meaningful context 
(§1-2). For philosophers of mind, this often shows itself in a commitment to a reductionist 
study of consciousness with an insensitivity to the significance and irreducibility of 
subjectivity, but in which latent Cartesianism can be identified. Similarly for psychiatry, a 
view of the mind that navigates under a biological paradigm has resulted in aspects of patient 
experience with meaning and significance being isolated, and dismissed, unless they can be 
explained on a neurophysiological basis in line with the reductionist picture (§3). I explore an 
undesirable consequence of this conception, namely its impact on understanding of illness, 
including depression, and in turn, pregnancy (§4-5). I defend a holistic, phenomenological 
perspective in contrast to the aforementioned positions, and in particular, a form of 
phenomenology that is open to a weak scientific naturalisation such that phenomenology can 
be integrated with scientific resources, but without requiring that phenomenological data is 
constrained by a reductionist methodology (§6-8). 
My second chapter offers an analysis of the phenomenology of pregnancy and early 
motherhood with specific focus on vulnerability to depression-experience. The account I 
present is largely influenced by existing accounts of the phenomenology of illness, with 
particular focus on depression. Existing literature on the phenomenology of illness is opened 
up to an analysis of pregnancy by the recognition of the phenomenological similarity in some 
women between an experience of pregnancy and an experience of illness (§1). From this, I 
explore various ways in which the pregnant woman’s experience might be altered in 
pregnancy such that it might dispose her towards depressive experience, also discussing 
factors that influence this vulnerability (§2-8). What is key in each of these ways that 
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experience is altered is the disruption to the standard experience of the lived body [Leib] 
through which all aspects of phenomenal consciousness arise.  
My third and final chapter focuses on the problem of inadequate sensitivity to the subjective 
experience of women in pregnancy and early motherhood in healthcare, namely the kind of 
experience outlined in the preceding chapter that is often dismissed as a result of the 
dominance of the paradigm that is operated within as outlined in the first chapter (§1). This 
complaint is cashed out in terms of epistemic injustice against pregnant women, developed 
from existing narratives about epistemic injustice against ill persons in the clinical encounter 
(§2-4). This chapter aims to illustrate how the phenomenological approach I have put forward 
might facilitate better self-understanding, and therefore resilience, in the women in question 
(§5-7). This points towards a way of mitigating the effects of the said epistemic injustices.  
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Chapter 1 
Naturalising Phenomenology  
1. Context 
The transcendental aspirations characteristic of classical phenomenology, found principally in 
Husserl (1931, 1954), seem to suggest that phenomenology’s incorporation with the natural 
sciences is unattainable, and ultimately undesirable. However, it is not at all clear that this 
ought to be the case. Here I will work to defend a moderate scientific naturalism through 
which there can be compatibility between phenomenology and science. On my view, there is 
potential for phenomenology and the sciences to share explananda to a certain extent, 
however, this need not necessitate a dismissal of irreducible phenomenological data. On this 
picture, the resistance to dogmatic naturalism that is characteristic of phenomenological 
literature is maintained, but we are left with the promise of a cooperative project.  
Some phenomenologists have faced accusations of misrepresenting what a scientific 
naturalisation requires, as well as conflating different forms of naturalism (Ferry-Danini, 
forthcoming; Sholl, 2015) 1. I will be referring to scientific naturalism defined as the view 
that the empirical sciences are metaphysically and epistemologically privileged over all other 
forms of enquiry, and so anything we take to be real should be incorporated into the account 
of reality we have as provided through science (Ratcliffe, 2013a, p. 67). While some 
defending contemporary theories of mind, such as Daniel Dennett, demote the role of 
phenomenology to a sort of complementing decoration for third-person scientific 
                                                          
1 The complaint is typically that such philosophers are guilty of conflating metaphysical and epistemological 
naturalism. I am not convinced that this is representative of the literature, though I will say little more about it 
here. For now, see the following definition of scientific naturalism provided by Ratcliffe, which identifies both 
epistemological and metaphysical naturalism as relevant to the concern.  
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explanations of consciousness localised in the brain, I want to insist that phenomenological 
descriptions can be valuable regardless of whether they should, or can, be reduced.   
2. Husserl and Merleau-Ponty 
The school of phenomenology with which I am primarily concerned here is that which has its 
foundations in the work of Husserl and the later Merleau-Ponty. Husserl’s development of 
phenomenology took great inspiration from the work of Descartes, and Husserl was 
especially influenced by Descartes’ mode of philosophical reflection, that is, his methodology 
as a process of establishing philosophy as a science grounded on an absolute foundation, 
namely conscious experience. This attention to the objects of consciousness orientates us 
towards the ego cogito as the ‘apodictically certain’ basis for judgements; the basis on which, 
according to Husserl, philosophy and the sciences ought to be grounded (Husserl, 1964, p. 
18). In the introduction to his Cartesian Meditations, Husserl writes that, although one must 
come to reject near enough the entirety of Cartesian philosophy, Descartes’ influence on what 
would become transcendental phenomenology was so great that one might be justified in 
understanding it as a form of neo-Cartesianism (ibid).  
Husserl’s phenomenology proposes a philosophical methodology by which all 
presuppositions about the world must be abandoned in order to establish the starting point by 
which subsequent tasks, in natural science as well as in philosophy, can be carried out. A key 
methodological principle in Husserl’s phenomenology is presuppositionlessness, often 
discussed in tandem with critique of the natural sciences and their failure to adopt a ‘pure’, 
presuppositionless methodology. The characteristic criticism found in Husserl is that 
scientific practice is loaded with such presuppositions; it takes a lot for granted, and as a 
consequence of this, forgets the world that it is grounded in and becomes mere abstraction. 
Ultimately, however, the goal of phenomenology is to establish a phenomenologically-
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grounded, and therefore ‘apodictically certain’, foundation for science: Husserl in the Crisis, 
for example, describes his project as serving to provide a preparatory reflection for science 
(Husserl, 1970, p.122). With this we will not only be in a better position to ascertain 
meaningful results in science, but it will also become clearer what sort of scientific tasks we 
ought to be engaged in.  
For Husserl, presuppositionlessness meant that one ought only to be concerned with the facts 
of natural existence, which is exclusively that which we can arrive at through conscious first-
person experience. Our philosophical inquiry therefore, with its foundations in conscious 
experience, provides a radical starting point for all subsequent philosophical and scientific 
inquiry, and one that is free of theoretical baggage, or ‘dogma’. Finding oneself at this 
starting point necessitates engagement in the phenomenological reduction, i.e., a reduction to 
pure consciousness, to the ‘transcendental-phenomenological ego’ (Husserl, 1964, p. 26). The 
reduction involves the suspension of all judgements and beliefs about the world, and the 
exclusion of assertions which cannot be realised, in their entirety, phenomenologically 
(Farber, 1966, p. 30).  
Merleau-Ponty’s subsequent development of Husserl’s phenomenology differs significantly 
in various ways. First, Merleau-Ponty and Husserl are typically understood to have had held 
different views regarding phenomenology’s status as a transcendental philosophy. Although 
Merleau-Ponty reported to be engaging in a transcendental project, as in Husserl, some have 
argued that his position fails to meet the conditions for a transcendental analysis because of 
the extent to which his analysis incorporates the findings of the empirical sciences (Inkpin, 
2017). However, what is required by the transcendental for Husserl is not unanimously 
agreed upon either; in fact Julia Jansen proposes that Husserl was advocating a much more 
open attitude to the transcendental than is often attributed to him, one that simply identifies 
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“from one’s own explicit historical and cultural standpoint, salient philosophical “motifs” to 
clarify and enrich one’s own account” (2017, p. 36). 
In the same vein, on at least some interpretations (of which there are many), Husserl and 
Merleau-Ponty appear to adopt different positions regarding phenomenology’s ontological 
commitments, or whether phenomenology defends a form of realism or idealism. Sebastian 
Gardner defends a reading of Merleau-Ponty as endorsing a form of transcendental idealism 
whereby the arguments in the Phenomenology of Perception carry metaphysical implications 
(Gardner, 2015).2 Keith Allen, however, points out that Merleau-Ponty later wrote of his 
dissatisfaction with his treatment of idealism in the Phenomenology, and later attempted to 
clarify his rejection of it.3 With this in mind, Allen interprets Merleau-Ponty as defending a 
form of naïve realism about perception, but one that nevertheless retains its transcendental 
nature (Allen, forthcoming). As with Merleau-Ponty, there is dispute over whether Husserl 
defended phenomenology as fundamentally realist or idealist, interestingly, a dispute which 
Husserl himself deemed fruitless (Husserl, 1930, p. 563). An interpretation of Husserl and 
Merleau-Ponty’s positions on this is not something I wish to establish here, for as the brief 
survey of plausible interpretations of Merleau-Ponty above suggests, phenomenology can sit 
comfortably with multiple metaphysical views.  
More importantly for my purposes here, I note another way in which Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology diverged significantly from Husserl’s. Merleau-Ponty greatly enriched the 
phenomenological account of the role of the body in perception, and our embeddedness in the 
world through the body, using the concept of being-in-the-world to facilitate a more 
                                                          
2 Gardner defends this interpretation of Merleau-Ponty in contrast to what he calls the ‘psychological 
interpretation’, whereby one can make claims about the nature of perceptual experience independently of any 
transcendental or metaphysical presuppositions. 
3 Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the ‘flesh’ in The Visible and the Invisible (1964/1968) was intended to work to 
rectify this. 
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comprehensive account of Husserl’s life-world [Lebenswelt]. Merleau-Ponty writes in the 
introduction to part two of the Phenomenology of Perception: ‘the theory of the body is 
already a theory of perception’ (1962, p. 209). We can understand ourselves as being bodies 
as opposed to just ‘having’ bodies, or being in some other relation to them, making Husserl’s 
concept of the transcendental ego redundant. We are embodied creatures embedded in the 
world, and so it makes little sense to conceive of ourselves as pure egos in some ‘external’ 
relation to our bodies, as Husserl had outlined the relationship. Rather, it makes more sense to 
hold that the body has a constitutive role in experience (Carman, 1999, p. 208). In this sense, 
on Merleau-Ponty’s account, experience is grounded in the lived body.  
3. Reductionist accounts of consciousness  
In stark contrast to the picture sketched above, which I will later return to, a popular and 
particularly problematic perspective on consciousness in contemporary philosophy of mind 
holds that a proper explanation of consciousness can be provided through a study of the brain. 
Dennett (2001) defends this view.4 On this view, a third-person perspective in natural science 
can fully explain consciousness without anything philosophically significant left to explain. 
This perspective is not a new one; in fact some sixty years earlier, Merleau-Ponty warned 
against the very sort of view Dennett proposes in his criticism of psychologists, where he 
writes that ‘our experience, already besieged by physics and biology, would be entirely 
dissolved by objective knowledge when the system of the sciences was complete’ (1962, p. 
97). 
Dennett acknowledges that his view is likely to be met with a visceral resistance, though he 
writes that what is important is that one ought not to attribute any value to this feeling: the 
                                                          
4 Similar positions can be found in other reductionists and functionalists about consciousness (see Churchland 
1986). 
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fact that we feel this way (Dennett calls it the ‘Zombic Hunch’) doesn’t constitute a 
reasonable motivation for revolutionising how we look at consciousness. He writes:  
‘I feel it [the gut intuition that a third-person perspective in natural science cannot 
answer all questions of consciousness without philosophically significant residue], but 
I don’t credit it’ (Dennett, 2001). 
Dennett’s work on consciousness involves direct criticism of phenomenology, according to 
which criticism, phenomenological methodology does not and cannot qualify as a sound 
scientific method. Phenomenological descriptions express the subject’s beliefs, are ‘stories’, 
and in no way reflect the ‘real facts’ about consciousness. Phenomenological descriptions can 
be useful, say, in predicting behaviour, if it is found that what is given in such descriptions 
matches up to what is really going on in the brain. Crucially, if such descriptions do not 
match up with the results of brain research, we can dismiss them, and conclude that the 
subject who expressed the beliefs in question was mistaken. So, for Dennett, phenomenology 
offers no reason to change the way we look at consciousness because it has no role beyond 
being a sort of descriptive preliminary to the truly ‘scientific’ study of the mind that we 
currently adopt, i.e., one that is neurocentric, objective and reliable. This reflects the view 
that a comprehensive account of consciousness can and should be reductionist; this pervasive 
perspective is something I will argue against throughout the chapter. 
Another aspect of Dennett’s criticism of phenomenology that is worth swift address is the 
accusation that it employs an introspectionist methodology, which is inherently unreliable. 
Phenomenologists, according to Dennett, seek to gain access to their minds by some 
‘introspectionist bit of mental gymnastics’ (1989, p. 153).5 This accusation demonstrates a 
                                                          
5 Tim Bayne has also written that the phenomenologist’s commitment to the claim that phenomenological 
method is distinct from introspection remains improperly defended (2004). My response to Dennett also speaks 
to Bayne’s concern.  
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misinterpretation of the phenomenological positions set out in at least both Husserl and 
Merleau-Ponty. For instance, Husserl writes that the notion that everything must be either 
physical or psychical ought to be rejected (Husserl, 1966, p.338), and the idea of an 
introspective methodology is something that tacitly endorses the existence of this divide 
(Zahavi, 2007, p. 29). Similarly, Merleau-Ponty wrote that ‘inside and outside are 
inseparable. The world is wholly inside and I am wholly outside myself’ (1962, p. 407). 
Phenomenology straightforwardly rejects the view that consciousness is something that lives 
only inside the mind, separately from the world, and therefore straightforwardly rejects the 
accusation that the phenomenologist employs an introspective methodology. 
Let us return to Dennett’s claim that phenomenology offers no compelling reason to change 
the way we investigate consciousness. Do we have good grounds for revolutionising the 
science of consciousness? This depends on what our account of consciousness endeavours to 
do. I argue that if we want it to have meaningful context, and therefore sensitivity to the 
subject’s embeddedness in the world, then it should. Some research in the medical sciences 
and psychiatry has criticised the unwavering commitment to an exclusively third-person 
methodology. Such debate is not entirely isolated from the problems with the rise of 
proponents of both physicalist and dualist perspectives. Those who belong to the former 
camp are encouraged by the promise of rigour and reliability in scientific method, where 
those who belong to the latter camp characteristically seek to defend the significance of first-
person experience that cannot be accounted for on the physicalist’s picture. The popular 
physicalist perspective in the medical sciences feeds these views in philosophy that either the 
physicalist picture gives us everything we need, or that the picture is still incomplete, and so 
there remains ‘mind-stuff’, or ‘qualia’, left over, which neither the natural scientist nor the 
non-religious person is expected to find meaningful. Neither position accommodates the 
subject’s embeddedness in the world.  
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Amongst the ample physicalist theories within the philosophy of mind that attempt to 
overcome the Cartesian divide (functionalism, epiphenomenalism, eliminativism, etc.), the 
foundation of the mind shrinks to the brain (Fuchs, 2011, p.199). Alternatively, the dualist 
who commits himself to maintaining a defence of non-reducible mind-stuff is left with an 
inadequate toolkit when they attempt to explain their qualia, which works to undermine the 
meaningfulness of this ‘feeling’ aspect, providing convincing grounds for Dennett’s ‘zombic 
hunch’. In none of these options is the meaningful relationship between mind and life 
accommodated, and so the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness, as put forward by David 
Chalmers (1995), cannot be meaningfully solved. It will of course continue to be unsolvable 
as long as mind and life are conceptualised in such a way that they intrinsically exclude one 
another (Fuchs, ibid). The dynamic character of consciousness cannot be understood as long 
as we continue to work within the framework that individual conscious states can be 
translated into corresponding brain states. However, we seem to function in both the 
philosophy of mind and psychiatry as though they can in failing to accommodate the fact that 
the neurocognitive system and our experiential world are not one and the same, but are 
constitutively related.  
Thomas Fuchs has highlighted and criticised contemporary psychiatric practice’s operation 
within a ‘biological paradigm’, writing that psychotherapies that focus on understanding and 
empathy as opposed to any localised pathology are considered to be taking elaborate and 
unnecessary detours (2015). In addition, there is a pressure to obtain measurable results as is 
done in other medical disciplines, as opposed to having to support diagnoses on so-called 
‘soft’ subjective data. Fuchs lists four crucial ways in which the biological paradigm in 
psychiatry shows itself (2015, my translation): 
1. Reductionism: On a reductionist model, psychiatric problems are investigated at the 
neurobiological level, and so consciousness is seen in terms of neural mechanisms alone. 
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Fuchs highlights that on this picture, the sense of free will becomes something of an illusion 
– I will say more about this later.  
2. Reification: Mental or subjective states are sought to be localised in the brain, and so once 
it is known where in the brain depression, for example, is caused, it is then taken that it is 
more effective to treat the patient pharmacologically, as opposed to attempting to understand 
and treat the subject’s psychological condition.   
3. Isolation: This perspective tends to separate the individual and their condition from their 
relationship with the world and their environment within which their condition was created 
and maintained.  
4. Medicalisation: Once conceptualised as brain-processes, psychiatric disorders are 
interpreted as exclusively medical territory. On this picture, for example, shyness and 
introversion may be interpreted clinically as social phobias. This we might call 
‘pathologising’ behaviour. This attitude has resulted in an increasing number of psychiatric 
diagnoses in the international classification systems.  
This biological paradigm sets itself firmly within the third-person perspective which operates 
as the standard scientific approach, valuing reliability and quantifiability. Psychiatry in this 
way limits itself to capturing particular symptoms and behavioural markers (that might be 
considered reliable subjective experiences), endeavouring to classify specific abnormal 
behaviours and link them up with neurophysiological dysfunctions i.e. sub-personal causes. 
This is the kind of perspective that Dennett puts his faith in. On this picture, there is a failure 
to capture the experience of the patient as one coherent whole. Vital, meaningful aspects of 
human experience are nowhere to be seen in diagnostic materials, and consequently, we have 
lost the vocabulary to express and describe these phenomena. I will say more about this in 
chapter three.  
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The phenomenological concept that we are embodied beings in the world offers us a more 
plausible perspective on consciousness as an all-encompassing process, offering a more 
comprehensive account of the gap between mind, body and world that is grounded in bodily 
intentionality. As Merleau-Ponty wrote: 
‘Reflex, insofar as it opens itself to the sense of a situation, and perception, insofar as 
it does not first of all posit an object of knowledge and insofar as it is an intention of 
our total being, are modalities of a pre-objective perspective that we call ‘being in the 
world’ (1962, p. 81). 
On this picture, consciousness ought not to be conceived of as some object localisable in the 
anatomical body (as a Dennettian approach would argue), nor a sort of purely mental state (as 
a traditional dualist might think), but as a process undergone through our relation to the 
world. That is, consciousness is an achievement that is enacted. We can make progress with 
our study of consciousness in the philosophy of mind and the medical sciences if we conceive 
of consciousness from a phenomenological perspective: as something that we live and enact 
through our feeling bodies.  
Here we return to the concept of the lived body [Leib]. In rejecting the presupposition of mind 
and body as two fundamentally separate entities, the concept of the lived body offers a 
coherent perspective on the problem of the ‘epistemic gap’ that other conceptions are 
committed to fruitlessly trying to explain in an attempt to map physical properties on to 
phenomenal experience. This more holistic conception of consciousness puts emphasis back 
on the importance of how we as embodied subjects find ourselves in the world, and how the 
body is inextricably related to the life of the mind. Husserl, for example, writes that our lived 
body is never absent from the perceptual field, and that our organs of perception play a 
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constant role in consciousness. Our lived body is what grounds our stream of consciousness, 
our ‘I-ness’ [Leibliche Ichlichkeit] (Husserl, 1970, p.105-9). 
 
4. Mental and physical illness 
Such a distinction typically made between the mind and the body, or the mental and the 
physical, pervades our understanding of human experience. The experience of illness is a 
paradigm example. The reductionist distinction between mental and physical illness has its 
roots largely in Cartesian dualism of the 18th century, as well as in the introduction of the York 
Retreat as established by William Tuke of the Quaker community. The York Retreat introduced 
so-called ‘moral treatment’, as opposed to the typical inhumane treatment of ‘lunatics’ at the 
time. The lunatic’s affliction was considered to be beyond the scope of the physician, but 
requiring a radically different type of medical intervention than would be received in cases of 
conditions with more obviously bodily symptomatology for which the subject was not 
considered to be afflicted by ‘madness’. The successes of the York Retreat and the 
corresponding ‘Period of Humane Reform’ largely positively influenced public opinion in its 
unique and non-medical treatment of madness, or disorders of the mind (Kendell, 2001; Kibria 
& Metcalfe, 2016). From the success of this and similar facilities that followed, the view that 
mental illness was radically different in kind from physical illness in that it required non-
medical, ‘philosophical’ treatment was consolidated.  
With the sophistication of modern medicine since then, mental illness has since begun to be 
considered medical territory once more. However, for pragmatic reasons, the distinction 
continues to be employed, leading to a complicated and unhelpful picture of the nature of and 
relationship between mental and physical illness. Current medical materials, namely the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 
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1995), though they admit that the distinction is superficial and that boundaries between 
illnesses are ‘porous’, continue to use it because it allows for ease of use, and moreover, 
because there is no apparent appropriate substitute. Kendell proposes that the word ‘mental’ 
ought to be replaced with ‘psychiatric’ (2001). I find it difficult to see in what sense this 
replacement is helpful beyond replacing a word that has come to carry negative connotations, 
since beyond the stigmatising connotations one might associate with the word ‘mental’, the 
two words are largely synonymous. Even if this would prove to be a helpful step in that regard, 
still, use of either word continues to perpetuate the assumption that the two are radically 
different in kind.  
As I will demonstrate in the following chapter, any consistent qualitative difference between 
the two is difficult to identify.6 Regardless, there remains public opinion that symptoms of so-
called mental illness such as depression are in some sense ‘less real’ than symptoms of 
straightforwardly physical illness. To suffer a mental illness seems to indicate that the sufferer 
of mental illness has more control over their condition, and so they are suffering as a result of 
some sort of lack of ‘moral fibre’ as opposed to any physiological lesion over which the subject 
has no control (Kendell, 2001, p. 492).  
A revolt against this trivialising of mental illness can be found latching onto the cerebrocentric 
perspective that attempts to localise the physiological foundations of a mental illness in the 
brain. This is particularly prominent in cases of depressive illness. Though there are some 
physiologically localisable changes in the brain in cases of mental illness, since the subject’s 
embeddedness in the world is entirely absent from such analyses, these identifiable 
physiological changes do not represent a complete explanation of the depression. This 
                                                          
6 Kendell (2001) writes that the difference between mental and physical illness is ‘quantitative’ rather than 
‘qualitative’. I am taking this to mean that both so-called mental and physical illness are likely to feel similar, 
and are therefore often indistinguishable on these grounds, but it is the physiological basis of an illness that 
informs its labelling as one rather than the other. 
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approach, therefore, is still problematic in that in trying to remove blame, it eliminates 
responsibility, resulting in a sense of compromised free will on the part of the sufferer. On this 
picture, mental illness becomes a disease of the brain, and so the role of the self, and therefore 
of the subject’s agency, is compromised: subjectivity and intentionality’s reduction to physical 
descriptions therefore results in the subject’s impotence (Fuchs, 2017). When such affective 
phenomena are reduced down to processes of the brain, there comes an identification of the 
self with the brain which naturally leads to the view of self as an illusion. Here the brain, the 
locus of our perception, merely feeds us representations of the world, and our position in the 
world is reduced to perceiving representations of the way that things ‘really are’, much like 
prisoners in Plato’s cave.7 The nature of experience cannot be represented in objective facts 
without loss, not because of elusive ‘mind-stuff’ or ‘qualia’ that is meaningfully distinct from 
the body, but because of the nature of ‘subjectivity itself’ of which the lived body, as opposed 
to the anatomical body, is the medium (Fuchs, 2017, p. 35). Since subjectivity is irreducible, it 
is not possible to develop a comprehensive picture of consciousness under a reductionist 
framework. 
It is true that the agency of the self is important in cases of both so-called mental and physical 
illness. There is good evidence to believe that one’s affective states can generate physiological 
changes that play a role in the creation and maintenance of so-called somatic illnesses with 
localisable pathology (2001, p. 491). Research on stress and immunology is an encouragingly 
striking example of this. The past twenty years has seen a strong body of evidence suggest that 
increased levels of inflammation identified in a significant number of patients diagnosed with 
neurologically localisable clinical depression has its origins in exposure to stress in childhood, 
or even in the womb, just as much as it does in direct exposure to inflammation (Pariante, 
2017). It is not therefore the mind that becomes diseased in so-called mental illness, nor is it 
                                                          
7 There are plenty of examples of this sort of view this in Metzinger (e.g. 2009)  
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the body that becomes diseased in so-called physical illness, but in both cases it is the entire 
self, the whole organism and its subjective world, that is afflicted.  
As long as we continue to use these distinguishing terms, we remain held back by a confused 
hybrid of physicalism (as a result of ‘cerebrocentric’ medicalisation of mental illness) and 
idealism (as a result of defending the substantial difference in kind between the two) that 
prevents us from conceiving of illness as something that afflicts the entire self. As Fuchs writes: 
‘Materialism and subjective idealism paradoxically extend hands to each other as they 
ascertain the point they have in common: namely, that the subject has no part in the 
world’ (Fuchs, 2017, p. 30).  
An example of this is the commonly held cerebrocentric view that for example, a pain that is 
experienced as being in one specific part of the body is an illusion created by the brain. The 
conception of the lived body allows us to avoid this: the subjective space of one’s pain and 
the objective space of where the pain is felt do not belong to two separate worlds which 
communicate with one another only through the brain, rather, the subjective and objective 
space of the body synoptically coincide (ibid). Merleau-Ponty makes a similar point: 
‘The patient bitten by a mosquito need not look for the point of the bite; he finds it 
immediately, because it is not for him a matter of situating it in relation to axes of 
coordinates in objective space, but rather of reaching with his phenomenal hand a 
certain painful place on his phenomenal body… a lived relation is given in the natural 
system of one’s own body.’ (1962, p.108) 
I can meaningfully state both that I am experiencing a pain in my leg, as an affliction to my 
lived, feeling body, and refer to the same space in my objective body in which the pain is 
experienced in medical treatment (Fuchs, 2017). The lived body encompasses synoptically 
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both the subjective, feeling body, and the objective body. This embodied perspective offers a 
more comprehensive way of understanding illness, that is, as a disruption to the whole self.  
5. Significance for understandings of pregnancy 
For pregnancy and early motherhood, which will become the main focus for this thesis, there 
are similarly undesirable consequences of the adoption of the reductionist paradigm in the 
medical sciences discussed above, namely the belief that the reality of one’s situation is 
detached from its subjective, embodied experience. That is, that proper knowledge about 
one’s situation is to be gained from the medical perspective as opposed to from what is given 
through first-person experience. Though what is given from the first-person perspective 
might correlate with what is thought to be ‘really’ going on at the naturalistic level, it is 
perceived to be a less reliable guide to the reality of one’s situation. The naturalistic 
explanation therefore has epistemic priority.  
This kind of perspective compromises the pregnant woman’s agency in medical situations, 
undermining the woman’s confidence in interpreting her own experience since medical 
knowledge is perceived to be the most legitimate sort of knowledge about one’s condition. 
This perspective has been criticised for fostering reliance on the visual paradigm of 
knowledge of one’s pregnancy, under which one perceives one’s objective body as an object 
(Freeman, 2014, p. 2-3). This too feeds the belief that knowledge derived from other sense 
modalities is less informative, which works to invalidate the legitimacy of women’s 
embodied experience (ibid). It is the dominance of an epistemology based on the visual sense 
that reinforces the view that our embodied experience is less significant than what we can see 
from a medical scan (Fuchs, 2017, p. 31). Though medical information is informative and 
useful for predictions (and an ultrasound scan, for example, might be personally meaningful 
to those interested in the life of the baby), what is harmful is the paradigm that the 
25 
 
information that is gained under the reductionist, naturalistic paradigm is the most 
meaningful sort of information. On this picture, embodied experience is demoted, and such 
‘feeling’ experiences are attributed to the illusory sensations that are produced by the brain. 
Moreover, this perceived asymmetry between the legitimacy of knowledge gained through 
embodied experience and that which is gained through the standard third-person naturalistic 
perspective in medicine can work to undermine the relationship between patient and 
physician. Where it is thought that the only way for the woman in question to gain ‘real’ 
knowledge about her condition is to be told about it by a physician, should what she is told is 
‘really going on’ not converge with her embodied experience, the woman may feel as though 
she is left with an inadequate toolkit for attempting to understand the way that her experience 
presents itself to her. I will say more about this in chapter three.   
6. A motive for a moderately naturalised phenomenology 
As we know, if we want to take the concept of the lived body seriously, it is clear that we 
must show that there is something missing from a reductionist study of the body. My 
complaint so far has been that it is misguided to base our understanding of our bodily 
experience exclusively on what is able to be determined by a study of the purely anatomical 
body. Crucially, since the body is the medium of our engagement with the world, it makes 
little sense to study the body from an objective, third-person perspective, and as a separate 
project, investigate it in its relation to the world (Zahavi, 2002, p. 21).  
However, it should be clear that this complaint is not intent on rejecting the achievements and 
findings of a paradigmatic naturalistic study of the body, which is good at and for many 
things. Rather, it is a call for a scientific method that is prepared to meaningfully incorporate 
the lived body into its scope of concern should it wish to identify an approach that is truly 
holistic, which in psychiatry, it surely should. This necessarily requires engagement with the 
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first-person perspective. I will show that in light of this, there is good reason to suggest that 
the most promising way of encouraging psychiatry to incorporate the subjective into their 
methodology, is to be open to the prospect of a moderately naturalised phenomenology.  
First, it is important to note that a common worry for contemporary phenomenologists is that 
phenomenology as an exercise in transcendental philosophy makes the idea of fruitful 
engagement with the positivistic sciences seem unattainable, or that conversely, whatever 
naturalistic phenomenological resources we might establish in the sciences lose the right to 
be called philosophical phenomenology (Moran, 2013). Characteristically, in undergoing 
transcendental phenomenology we are seeking to expose fundamental structures of 
experience available through my first-person perspective as given to me in ‘prescientific life’, 
as you find it, having bracketed objective scientific opinions characteristic of the ‘naturalistic 
attitude’ (Husserl, 1970, p.122). On this picture, being an advocate of a naturalised 
phenomenology carries a sense of compromised loyalty to classical phenomenology’s 
transcendental aspirations. The worry here is then that in naturalising phenomenology we are 
abandoning the core of the phenomenological method and therefore abandoning that which 
has philosophical significance. Or as summed up succinctly, and ominously, by Zahavi: 
‘[Naturalised phenomenology] is not phenomenology understood as a philosophical 
discipline, tradition, or method’ (2004, p.340).  
I am sceptical that this has to be the case. Whether it is true or not is dependent on what is, or 
ought to be, required by naturalisation. Zahavi (2004) offers four perspectives with varying 
degrees of hostility to phenomenology’s interaction with scientific naturalism that the 
phenomenologist might adopt. The fourth of these perspectives proposes that there can be 
fruitful exchange between transcendental phenomenology and the empirical sciences. As 
follows: 
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‘Perhaps it can even be naturalized in the sense of “contributing to the project of 
naturalization.” But of course, if this view is advocated it has to be realized that such a 
naturalization will not only lead to a modification of transcendental phenomenology, 
at the same time it will also transform the very concept of naturalization…’ (2004, 
p.343) 
Here the thought is that we might still be able to naturalise phenomenology without doing 
some of the other things to it that are typically, and misguidedly, associated with 
naturalisation, namely the reducing and objectifying that is characteristic of the dominant 
paradigm. I would argue that this approach to the relationship between phenomenology and 
the natural sciences has potential to cultivate the best results, and is much compatible with the 
resources that have so far been developed - which I will say more about shortly. My 
conviction is that we can offer good arguments in favour of a transcendental phenomenology 
that can be engaged in mutually enriching practice with empirical science, so long as we can 
secure an attitudinal shift in scientific approaches to consciousness whereby we recognise 
that subjectivity is irreducible, and therefore that phenomenological explanations do not need 
to be reduced to physiological processes in order to be complete. We can engage 
constructively with the empirical sciences, and retain value in subjective phenomenological 
descriptions. 
Importantly, the picture of phenomenology we have here is still philosophically significant. 
For example, as defended by Zahavi, Merleau-Pontian phenomenology requires confrontation 
with the empirical sciences if it is to develop properly, and that this can happen without 
reducing phenomenology to another ‘positive science’ (2004, p. 342). This is of course not to 
propose a form of naturalised phenomenology whereby phenomena can be ‘mathematised’. 
Rather, it is to propose a form of naturalised phenomenology whereby the accounts provided 
by the empirical scientist and the phenomenologist are different but intrinsically joined, i.e. 
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the two are cooperative. For the phenomenologist to adhere to the naturalist’s framework as it 
is often offered, as objectivistic and reductionist, undoubtedly necessitates a sacrifice of the 
subjective. However, crucially, naturalism need not, and indeed should not, be reductionist.  
7. Existing resources 
There are good existing examples of this proposal. In recent years, more contemporary 
phenomenologically-motivated medical materials have come to be established.8 The 
Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE) developed by Josef Parnas et al (2005) 
is a prime example of this. The EASE is a semi-structured resource, principally inspired by 
philosophical phenomenology,9 used for targeting disorders of subjective experience such as 
schizophrenia. This psychometric resource, now in practice in Denmark, requires conceptual 
understanding of the nature of disruptions to the self as provided by the inherently 
philosophical sort of phenomenology. The EASE highlights the legitimacy of the wider 
project of philosophical phenomenology inspiring and motivating frameworks for medical 
resources that are sensitive to, directly concerned with, and crucially, informed by, subjective 
experience. Of course this initiative does not reject all standard naturalistic approaches to 
psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia, for, say, the development of antipsychotic 
medication necessarily requires the employment of a reductionist methodology for at least 
some aspect of its development: what is resisted is that a comprehensive grasp of the patient’s 
disorder can be entirely realised through the employment of reductionist methodology i.e. 
appeals to reductionist neuroscience.10   
                                                          
8 See Carel (2011) for discussion of other recent resources of this kind. 
9 The mid-20th century also saw Husserl and Heidegger’s phenomenology influence practice in psychoanalysis, 
inspiring a form of anthropological psychiatry that would later be called Daseinsanalyse. In having functioned 
largely in blissful isolation from what would now be considered natural scientific approaches, this branch of 
psychoanalysis bares little on my argument here, but remains interesting (see Binswanger, 1968). 
10 For more on types of reductionism and appeals to neuroscience in psychiatry see Schaffner (2013). 
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There has also been compelling research examining whether mindfulness-based cognitive 
therapy is effective in preventing relapses in chronic depression, and moreover, how the 
therapeutic process is experienced by the patients (Malpass et al, 2012). The study was able 
to identify shifts in the way that patients come to experience the self and their illness, as well 
as points in treatment at which patients are most likely to experience difficulties.  
In both of these cases, the phenomenological accounts are meaningfully incorporated into a 
scientific, but not a reductionist, framework. The perceived legitimacy of ‘subjective’ data is 
not dependent on the scope of a pre-established reductionist scientific methodology. Such 
resources recognise that subjective experience, simply by virtue of being subjective, cannot 
and should not be reduced to objectivist explanation. 
The types of resources above may be considered successful tasks in naturalised 
phenomenology: the phenomenologist and the empirical scientist here are engaging in a 
mutually-enriching enterprise, offering different but complementing approaches.11 It would 
also seem as though little of what is philosophical about phenomenology has been 
compromised as a result. In both pieces of research the phenomenological data, 
encompassing idiosyncrasies between subjects, is guiding. Of course, here the 
phenomenological data itself has not been reduced, and I do not see convincing grounds for 
thinking that this is problematic.  
8. Irreducible phenomenological data 
‘Neurophenomenology’ might be regarded as a prime example of undergoing a stronger 
naturalisation of phenomenology, whereby in our study of consciousness, the phenomena of 
experience and cognitive science are mutual constraints on one another (Varela, 1996). The 
                                                          
11 We might think of this as an example of ‘explanatory pluralism’ (see Kendler, 2005).  
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neurophenomenologist claims that the naturalisation of phenomenological descriptions 
necessitates their mathematisation, and that the recent progress of science has shown that 
Husserl’s case against the naturalisation of phenomena is now invalid (Petitot, 1999). This is 
a misrepresentation of the foundations of Husserl’s philosophically motivated anti-
naturalism: Husserl staunchly opposed the mathematisation of philosophy on the grounds that 
philosophy cannot be defined mathematically simply by virtue of its philosophical nature 
(Husserl, 1983). Husserl’s anti-naturalism was not grounded in the complaint that scientific 
methodology is not yet sophisticated enough to mathematise experience without loss, but that 
the very nature of the naturalistic project already excludes subjective experience. It is missing 
the point to insist that in order to make progress, phenomenology ought to abandon its 
criticism of naturalism and just “get comfortable with it” (Ferry-Danini, forthcoming). The 
phenomenologist is not necessarily opposed to the sciences or cooperative engagement with 
the sciences, but is necessarily opposed to the view that the products of a phenomenological 
investigation might be reduced to objective explanation without loss. 
It is hopefully clear that the phenomenologists are not resistant to the sciences per se; it is 
instead the case that phenomenological literature attacks methodological shortcomings that 
are characteristic of scientific investigation. I am resisting the view that phenomenological 
data is valuable only once it has been ‘validated’ by reductionist, natural scientific 
investigation. We can be open to a weak naturalisation of phenomenology, and yet still 
maintain that phenomenological data has value independently of its correlation with a 
reductionist and objectivist natural scientific explanation. Dennett’s complaint that if the 
phenomenological descriptions do not ‘match’ the third-person evidence we have cause to 
deem them mistaken much bypasses this point: phenomenological data is of value to us 
simply by virtue of the fact that what is reported informs us about the nature of the subjective 
experience. How phenomena are presented to us is a constituent part of the nature of 
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consciousness. No account of consciousness can or should be considered complete that does 
not accommodate the subjective. 
It is possible to remain critical of scientific practice, but be open to the idea of engagement 
with the natural sciences in order to engage in a mutually illuminating dialogue between the 
two. Here we go some way in satisfying Merleau-Ponty’s call for phenomenology to 
understand its relationship with non-phenomenology. When phenomenology and naturalism 
can share the same explanandum, phenomenology can become problem-orientated in line 
with the wider naturalistic project, and therefore make progress with practical issues such as 
those in psychiatry.  
I have so far tried to show that the phenomenological conception of mind is preferable to its 
most popular competitor approaches in the philosophy of mind and psychiatry. Here we have 
a philosophy that is both appropriately faithful to subjective experience and that can speak 
meaningfully to natural scientific investigations. Chalmers has written that the science of 
consciousness can be ‘robust’ and successful without us having to have a solution to the 
mind/body problem: he proposes that we can remain neutral on such philosophical questions 
with our science of consciousness unaffected (2004, p.11). This, I think, is a mistake: for a 
comprehensive account of consciousness, our philosophical positions regarding the mind 
should to some extent accommodate our scientific positions regarding the mind and vice 
versa. For this, I have suggested that the phenomenologist needs to be open to a weak 
naturalisation just as the scientist, or in our case here the psychiatrist, needs to adjust their 
attitude towards consciousness so as to accommodate the subjective. I echo Ratcliffe’s 
sentiment here that ideally, the foundations of consciousness studies would be wholly 
recharacterised as to better accommodate the phenomenological view of the relationship 
between mind, body and world. Practically, though, if we want to make headway with issues 
such as those in psychiatry, we ought to rather aim for an attitudinal shift (2013a). A similar 
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position can be found in Carel’s Phenomenology of Illness (2016), in which she discusses the 
need for phenomenology as a ‘supplement’, a vital part of which being an attitudinal shift by 
which experiences of illness are better recognised and understood by clinicians. This brings 
me on to my second chapter, which is concerned with illuminating the nature of experience 
amongst women throughout pregnancy and early motherhood.  
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Chapter 2 
The Phenomenology of Pregnancy and Illness 
1. Pregnancy and illness  
This chapter will examine the phenomenology of pregnancy and early motherhood, 
particularly in women suffering from, or vulnerable to suffering from, depression (or 
something phenomenologically similar to it). This account does not intend to represent the 
experience of all such women, nor is it concerned only with those women who have received 
a clinical diagnosis of ante or postnatal depression. Indeed it is possible for one to have poor 
health but be undiagnosed, whether that is due to lack of consultation or because consultation 
concluded that the state is not sufficiently severe for diagnosis.  
My account is interested in structures of experience in such women that are 
phenomenologically like depression (or indeed other illness) experiences. I use the term 
‘depression’, in order to refer to ‘depression-like experience’. For my task at least, it does not 
seem necessary, or even desirable, to seek to identify the presence of some physiological 
basis, or cause, (such as a bio-marker) in order to distinguish a depression-like experience 
from a symptom of clinical depression. Indeed it is unclear how one ought to differentiate 
between a ‘healthy’ or ‘normal’ pregnancy experience that is nevertheless depression-like,12 
and an instance of depression that is caused in some way by pregnancy.13  
                                                          
12 There is a lot to be said about norms in health, though I do not have the space to discuss it here (see De Block 
& Sholl, forthcoming; Ryle, 1947) 
13 The same argument runs for many other conditions: for example, chronic fatigue experienced as a symptom 
of anaemia may give rise to depressive symptoms, but it is unclear whether or not one ought to hold that 
depression is a symptom of anaemia. 
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One plausible possibility might be that, though the nature of experience throughout 
pregnancy may not be in itself sufficient for depression, it may predispose the woman 
towards phenomenological changes that are.14 Another possibility might be simply that the 
ways in which experience alters in depression and in pregnancy can be similar. With this in 
mind, my aim here is to study phenomenological changes in various forms of illness 
experience, especially depression, and explore how pregnancy may involve similar shifts in 
experience. By studying the phenomenology of illness, structures of experience in pregnancy 
with phenomenologically-rich structural similarities can be illuminated such that we can 
develop a better understanding of vulnerabilities to depression during and following 
pregnancy. 
To begin with, it is worth providing a defence of what might seem to be an uncomfortable 
equation between pregnancy and illness. I work here from the picture of illness as involving: 
‘…the experience of one’s symptoms and bodily changes, but also the experience of 
receiving healthcare and experiencing social attitudes towards illness and disability, 
pain, grappling with one’s mortality, and negotiating what may become a hostile 
world’ (Carel, 2017, p. 17) 
‘Illness’ here is concerned with its experience, its qualitative dimension, rather than any 
‘facts of disease’, since the two can come apart (ibid). With this in mind, this definition 
seems plausible.15 However, it seems as though, on Carel’s picture, the pregnant woman is 
likely to qualify as being in a state of illness in at least some stage of her pregnancy. In 
pregnancy, the woman is sure to experience bodily change, some drastic and some more 
                                                          
14 See Ratcliffe (2015) for more on this discussion with regards to depression and somatic illness. 
15 It is not clear, however, whether these are sufficient or necessary conditions for illness, though Carel did not 
intend to offer such an account. It seems obvious enough that one could be ill but not be in pain, and conversely 
that one could be in pain and not be ill. Moreover, there are arguably cases of illness where one is not forced to 
confront one’s mortality, and again, there seem to be people who do, who are not ill. This just about scratches 
the surface of the great difficulty in attributing illness to a subject. 
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elusive, as well as pain or discomfort, again, some more intense and some more subtle - as 
does the person we might more readily attribute illness to. Some loss of normally assumed 
ability is common too, which requires adjusting to in pregnancy as it does in illness. 
Moreover, navigating social attitudes and adjusting to changes in how one is treated and 
perceived by others is a pressure felt by both pregnant women and people with more obvious 
cases of illness.  
Adopting the position that pregnant women’s experience is an illness experience seems like 
an unattractive position, and so one might think here that the definition of illness needs 
tightening in order to exclude illness experience being likened to the experience of pregnant 
women and consequently pathologising pregnancy. The problem comes in trying to identify 
loose ends in the definition: since we are interested in the experience, the ‘feeling’ dimension, 
we cannot distinguish between illness and health on biological or physiological grounds, so 
one must work to distinguish the two phenomenologically.16 
One straightforward potential avenue for distinction might be that illness is experienced as 
negative where, for many women, pregnancy is a positive experience. There is a commonly-
held perspective that illness is a meaningless experience of suffering, representing 
compensationless disruption, suffering and incapacity; indeed it is unclear to many what the 
value or the purpose of an illness experience is (Kidd, 2012, p. 503). This is of course not true 
of pregnancy – at least in most cases. It is true to say that the contemporary public opinion is 
that pregnancy is a largely positive experience in the sense that it is not a ‘disaster that 
strikes’ as we often think illness is (Carel, 2017, p. 131); rather we look forward to it, plan it, 
                                                          
16 See Carel (2017) for discussion on ‘disease-illness coupling’. Carel notes that though illness and disease do 
usually come together, the two can and do come apart: indeed it seems that one can be ill without being 
diseased, and diseased without being ill. Since it appears that one can be ill without being diseased, i.e. without 
any identifiable physiological basis for an illness experience, our account of illness should hold independently 
of whether any disease-illness coupling holds. 
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volunteer for it. It is a positive experience in that it is for something, due to the fact that it is 
experienced in anticipation of the birth of a child which is also widely thought to be 
valuable.17 In this sense at least, it looks as though the two experiences are intrinsically 
phenomenologically different. I will argue, however, that this is not necessarily the case, and 
so this distinction does not get us very far.18 
The belief that illness experience must be experienced as negative rests upon a pathophobic 
conception of illness that can and ought to be challenged (Carel, 2017, p. 131). This standard 
conception even has its roots in the etymology of the word ‘ill’, describing something 
harmful, unfortunate or even evil. Building on the work of Kidd (2012) and Carel (2017), I 
defend the view that illness can be compatible with well-being, and can in fact afford 
edification. Once we examine and undermine the standard conception of illness experience as 
necessarily negative, we can more comfortably investigate the phenomenologically-rich 
structural similarities between illness and pregnancy.  
There is a strong body of empirical research that suggests that for a number of reasons, illness 
need not, and often does not, result in any significant decrease in well-being. It appears to be 
the case that we are more resilient to distress than we might anticipate when we are in good 
health. One of these pieces of research studied levels of psychological and physical distress 
amongst cancer patients, finding that psychological distress or ‘symptoms’ did not 
automatically accompany physical distress (de Haes et al, 1990, p. 1036). We are able to say 
more than just that illness does not necessarily decrease levels of well-being in those who 
experience it. It is not just the case that well-being can persist through illness, it is reasonable 
                                                          
17 There are certainly philosophical positions which defend the view that coming into existence is bad for us (see 
Belshaw, 2012), but this view is uncommonly held, and so I will say no more about it here. 
18 What might be said about cases of rape if one favours this distinction, for example? There seem to be many 
bad reasons for holding that the woman pregnant through rape, as well as other cases of unplanned pregnancy, is 
ill where the woman pregnant through choice is not. 
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to think that illness can in fact afford growth, flourishing and edification (Carel, 2017, p. 
131). An experience of illness may, for example, afford me with a new sense of courage or 
appreciation for life or relationships which in my previous good health I lacked.19  
For now, I will suggest that pregnancy can involve similar experiences to those in illness (that 
are compatible with wellness), including depression-like experience (which is less compatible 
with wellness). I also wish to claim that disposition to this, with particular focus on the latter, 
can be dependent on the interpretation of experience, which is heavily influenced by 
psychological as well as cultural and social context (Carel, 2017, p. 132).20  
We can therefore say that pregnancy is ‘like’ illness in terms of the essential structural 
properties of the experience; the two experiences, then, can be alike in a phenomenologically-
rich structural sense. Without asserting that pregnancy is an instance of illness, we are 
nonetheless able to investigate their likeness in order to illuminate the structure of pregnancy 
experience. I will now focus on illuminating the phenomenology of more straightforwardly 
‘somatic’ illness in order to illustrate how similar shifts in experience may affect pregnant 
women. 
2. The intentional arc and possibility space  
I first explore how specific changes as part of an experience of illness influence the entirety 
of one’s conscious life. For this I turn to Merleau-Ponty’s description of the intentional arc. 
The intentional arc can be thought of as a pre-intentional, though changeable, state of being 
that determines what kind of perceptual experience is possible. It dictates the way that we 
find ourselves in the world, that is, our sense of being in the world. As Merleau-Ponty writes, 
                                                          
19 Kidd’s discussion of virtue ethics helps to flesh out the thought that illness facilitates opportunities for the 
cultivation of virtues, which in turn, can improve one’s chances of coping with changes (Kidd, 2012, p. 502). 
20 Such factors might be thought of as indicating the subject’s vulnerability. Ratcliffe entertains a similar 
thought in his discussion of those ‘prone to wobbles in the sense of reality’ (2013a). 
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consciousness’s intentional structure determines ‘what our reflexes and perceptions will be 
able to aim at in the world, the area of our possible operations, the scope of our life’ (1962, 
p.92). Each localised disruption, for example in illness, affects consciousness in its entirety, 
since consciousness is an activity of projection, the nature of which is established by its 
previous actions in the world. Though we can say that in illness, there are often specific 
lesions or changes on the physiological level, the whole of consciousness becomes vulnerable 
(ibid, p. 138).  
Ratcliffe’s discussion of existential feelings is helpful in making explicit how bodily feelings 
and disruptions to consciousness are linked. ‘Existential feeling’ is a unifying term used to 
refer to a distinct form of affective phenomena which our existing labels, i.e. emotion, mood 
or feeling, would split up. They are not the same as bodily feelings, though the body is often 
very much involved in them as the medium through which they are most strikingly 
experienced. There are instances in which some existential feelings might be felt almost 
entirely as a bodily experience, such as an experience of severe anxiety that is constituted by 
a sense of bodily tightness or confinement, where, for example, all that the world seems to 
offer is threat (Ratcliffe, 2015, p. 59).  
Here one’s orientation in the world, and the way of being in it as a whole faces disruption, 
and the subsequent experience of anxiety is very much a bodily experience. In cases like 
anxiety, the experience is such that what the world offers is restricted. This is one example of 
a shift in existential feeling that restricts possibilities. It is a disruption to both the self and 
one’s relation to the world. As I will demonstrate, possibility structure is deeply embedded 
into human experience, and shifts in existential feeling affect what possibility space we can 
inhabit. That is, changes in existential feeling are experienced as what possibilities are open 
to experience. Much like in other cases of illness experience, in pregnancy and early 
motherhood, one experiences, or is at least disposed to experiencing, a restriction of 
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possibilities. Moreover, so I will show, this restriction of possibility can be felt most 
strikingly as an experience of the lived body.  
3. Bodily doubt 
One particularly striking case of bodily feeling in the restriction of possibility space is Carel’s 
notion of bodily doubt in illness. In good health, she argues, we have a tacit sense of bodily 
certainty that characterises our normal everyday experience as embodied subjects. We have 
trust in this relationship, though as healthy subjects, it is not the subject of our explicit 
reflection (Carel, 2013, p. 2). We have implicit faith that our bodies will do as we intend, for 
example, that our legs will support us when we walk up the stairs, or that we can bend to put 
on our shoes without pain or discomfort. This is not something that we meditate over and 
justify, rather, we do not think about it at all. We possess an in-built trust that our body will 
respond to our action in a certain way, a way that is harmonious and familiar. In this healthy 
state, mind and body are integrated with one another such that bodily processes are 
transparent to the world (Fuchs, 2005, p. 95). Conversely, in illness, for example, where 
bodily certainty is disrupted and replaced with bodily doubt, that transparency is 
compromised.  
Where bodily certainty is disrupted, attention is withdrawn from the world and thrust onto the 
body (Carel, 2013, p.6). The faith in one’s body that had previously gone unquestioned is 
now under scrutiny, and one is forced to confront the reality that one’s bodily scope is 
restricted. That is, the scope of one’s bodily movement and engagement with the environment 
becomes narrower. With restriction of bodily scope, comes a restriction of worldly 
possibilities. This inability to engage with the world in a way which was once habitual 
frustrates bodily intentionality, and creates the feeling of bodily failure. The notion of 
frustrated bodily intentionality is clear in Merleau-Ponty, where he writes: ‘consciousness can 
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be seen attempting to maintain its superstructures even though their foundation has collapsed. 
It mimics its customary operations, but without the power of obtaining their intuitive 
realization and without the power of hiding the strange deficiency that steals from them their 
full sense’ (1962, p. 139).  
Merleau-Ponty identifies our sense of being in the world as involving a bodily sense of ‘I-
can’ (1962, p.146). This sense of ‘I-can’ has authority over what possibilities in the world are 
open or closed to us. On this model, we can see the sense of doubt in the subject’s ability to 
perform normal tasks, as a negation of this ‘I-can’ structure, where possibilities that for the 
healthy subject had not previously been even considered possibilities are now closed, or feel 
out of reach. Examples of this in pregnancy might include nausea and dizziness, and the 
corresponding inability to attempt and complete tasks which had previously been anticipated 
and completed without hesitation.21 With the closure of worldly possibilities, focus turns 
inward, and the intentional impulse of the subject’s experience is compromised. As long as 
focus is inwardly-directed as opposed to world-directed, an anxious fixation on the body is 
maintained. 
Since body and world are inextricably linked, this feeling of distrust in the body bleeds into a 
distrust of one’s world. One’s sense of being in the world finds itself under threat, and 
engaging with the world, and with others, becomes difficult. Here the habitual, confident 
anticipation and actualisation of possibilities that is so integral to a feeling of comfortably 
being in the world is compromised (Ratcliffe, 2015, p. 68). Since this sense of bodily 
certainty exists tacitly for us, one only becomes aware of the sense of bodily transparency 
                                                          
21 For discussion of similar obstacles in other illnesses, see Carel (2016) on breathlessness. One might also think 
that one might undergo similar experiences in other cases that are perhaps more obviously not cases of illness, 
such as loss of practice in sport, rapid weight gain or loss, or puberty. Though I would resist equating such cases 
with cases of illness, the possibility of phenomenological similarity between the two experiences may still be 
recognised. There may, therefore, still be scope for opening up the existing literature on the phenomenology of 
illness to the analysis of such phenomena. Whether this encourages a revision of how we characterise illness 
remains subject matter for further research.  
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that once was when it is lost, and conversely in good health, it ceases to be an object of 
reflection or us; as Jessica Friedmann writes in her essays on postnatal depression, ‘when I 
am well, the body wants to forget’ (Friedmann, 2017, p. 99).  
A comparable case of this might be the experience of navigating the world with a bad back. 
Here one might be required to move gingerly or avoid certain ‘normal’ bodily movements in 
an effort not to cause pain to the site of the discomfort. Here then engaging with the world in 
the ‘normal’ way is difficult, and one is required to make adjustments to the auto-pilot way in 
which actions are aimed at. This involves a change in one’s orientation in the world. I will 
now explore in more depth how such phenomenological changes might arise as part of an 
experience of pregnancy. 
4. Habit and the body schema 
I propose that struggling to adjust to changes in the body schema can be partially responsible 
for experiences of bodily doubt. This would apply most notably to changes affecting the 
inhabited bodily space, such as illnesses that involve use of a wheelchair or the loss of a limb, 
and importantly here, to changes to the extension and spatiality of the body in pregnancy. 
Here the healthy body as transparent, as an ‘indivisible possession’, may find itself under 
threat. Merleau-Ponty refers to this transparency of the lived body in health as the ‘darkness 
of the theatre required for clarity of the performance’ (1962, p. 103).22 In this sense, the body 
as transparent is necessary for the good health of the lived body and therefore appropriate 
engagement with the world.  In other words, one might say that a case of a struggle to adjust 
                                                          
22 It is worth recognising that feminist critiques of Merleau-Ponty have accused his account of the body of being 
insensitive to certain peculiarities of the body that are prescribed by gender (see Sullivan 1997). One such 
complaint is that, for women, it may be the case that even in good health, the body is never fully transparent as it 
is for men. My view is that this can be true with us still able to defend the view that anomalous experience 
thrusts the body under the spotlight in a way that differs significantly from how the body is standardly 
experienced. I also do not think that Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the body necessarily fails to accommodate such 
peculiarities (see Stoller, 2000). 
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to the changes to the body schema in pregnancy can result in a failure to incorporate the 
pregnant body into one’s overall bodily plan (1962, p.101).   
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of habit will help to flesh out this thought. In the acquisition of 
habit, the body has ‘understood’ the body’s motricity, where understanding here refers to 
experiencing the accord between that which is aimed at and that which is given (1962, p.146). 
To use Merleau-Ponty’s example, where the blind man has acquired the habit of using a cane 
to navigate his environment, things immediately appear passable or impassable for the body 
and its appendages. By virtue of this, the cane has become part of the blind man’s body 
schema. To habituate oneself to something is to ‘take up residence in it’, that is, for it to 
become part of one’s bodily space (1962, p. 144-6).  
Iris Marion Young is critical of Merleau-Ponty’s identification of the healthy body as a 
transparent, indivisible possession. She volunteers pregnancy as a paradigm case whereby the 
body can be enjoyed as a physical object without suffering a breakdown of one’s relationship 
with the world that carries a corresponding sense of alienation or estrangement. Young does 
however write that in pregnancy, the effort and resistance characteristic of all movement is 
felt strikingly and consistently (Young, 2005, p.50-53). I would argue that though one need 
not necessarily suffer here, the relationship with one’s world here is still radically altered. 
Young’s own descriptions seem to suggest that this is true: 
‘…the solid inertia and demands of my body call me to my limits not as an obstacle to 
action, but only as a fleshy relation to the earth. As the months proceed, the most 
ordinary efforts of human existence, such as sitting, bending and walking, which I 
formerly took for granted, become apparent as the projects they themselves are… in 
the experience of the pregnant woman, this weight and materiality often produce a 
sense of power, solidity, and validity’  
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‘In pregnancy I do not have a firm sense of where my body ends and the world 
begins. My automatic body habits become dislodged; the continuity between my 
customary body and my body at this moment is broken’ 
(ibid) 
 
This is consistent with my claims above that pregnancy is not necessarily experienced as 
negative, but that pregnancy includes, or can include, many of the phenomenological changes 
that are characteristic of illness experience. I will say more shortly about the factors that 
might influence the interpretation of such experience as negative or threatening.  
Regardless of their interpretation as threatening or enjoyable, bodily changes in pregnancy 
can highlight the difficulty in adjusting to one’s altered body schema. Discussions on online 
fora about difficulties with spatial awareness and judging one’s bump are in line with this 
thought, with women reporting a tendency to misjudge small gaps, walking into things, and 
people, even though they ‘know’ that their pregnant stomach protrudes out in front of them. 
Pregnant women have also been able to articulate that they are prone to moving in the world 
as though they still have their pre-pregnant body, which might involve sucking in one’s 
stomach in order to let people past, or attempting to squeeze through small spaces. Young’s 
own description is very similar: 
‘I move as if I could squeeze around chairs and through crowds as I could seven 
months before, only to find my way blocked by my own body sticking out in front of 
me – but yet not me, since I did not expect it to block my passage.’ (Young, 2005, p. 
50) 
In pregnancy, change in body shape and size is so alien and rapid that the sort of pre-
reflective constant adjustment that is usually engaged in in skill-acquisition may not take 
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place, and therefore the changes to the body do not take on significance. In other words, the 
experience is such that it does not afford the opportunity to properly employ one’s ‘practical 
wisdom’.23 The pregnant body, then, may not be incorporated into the body schema of the 
pre-pregnant body, and so one continues to act in the world as though through that pre-
pregnant body: ‘the prepregnant body image does not entirely leave my movements and 
expectations, yet it is with the pregnant body that I must move’ (Young, 2005, p. 50). As is 
echoed in the reports above, although the change in size and shape of their objective bodies is 
open to perception, and is ‘known’, the lived body has not incorporated the pregnant body 
into its schema. Where for the blind man, the cane becomes a ‘sensitive zone’ used for touch 
in a way much indistinguishable from the hands, the women here are struggling to ‘habituate’ 
themselves to the pregnant body, for habit does not reside in thought nor in the objective 
body (1962, p.144-6). 
This is reminiscent of a claim made by Toombs, a phenomenologist who suffers from chronic 
progressive multiple sclerosis, that illness involves a sort of ambiguity of own body, 
stemming from a transformation from lived body to object body (Toombs, 1988). 
Experiences of being looked at as an ill person have been described as forcing the subject 
towards a recognition of the brute fact of being ‘physico-biological stuff’ (ibid, p. 216). 
Toombs writes that experiencing this facticity of the self, in existing for the other as the 
object-body under scrutiny, the body as ‘other than me’, is an experience of alienation. There 
is a felt tension in being both at once the lived, feeling ‘own-body’, and the brute anatomical 
‘object-body’ that is highlighted in illness. Although I have acknowledged that in pregnancy 
this experience of the body as object does not necessarily afford alienation (though it surely 
can), the pregnant woman’s experience of the clinical encounter in pregnancy can be 
                                                          
23 See Gehrman (2016) for discussion on absorbed coping and practical wisdom. 
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recognised as one environment that might make women particularly vulnerable to this 
feeling: one is aware both of what it is like to be the feeling subject carrying a baby, but is led 
in the understanding of one’s situation by medical information provided by clinicians. Lauren 
Freeman discusses a similar problem that she calls ‘panoptics of the womb’ (2014), whereby 
the power of clinicians to provide information about women’s experience puts the women 
into a state of epistemic powerlessness. I will focus on this particular sort of problem in 
chapter three.    
So far I have painted a picture of the phenomenology of illness as one that can have influence 
over ones affective states, using words like ‘alienation’, ‘frustration’ ‘anxiety’ and ‘doubt’ in 
descriptions of experience characteristic of illness. Though illness can be compatible with 
well-being, it is clear that illness experience, and depression experience in particular, can 
have a profoundly destructive influence over our affective life. This brings me to the 
investigation of the ways in which pregnancy experience can feel like depression experience, 
particularly in women who have had a depression-like experience in the past.  
5. Temporality 
Notice in the above discussion of possibilities the reference to the anticipation of possibilities 
as well as the restriction of their actualisation. In illness we can identify a disturbance to the 
anticipatory structure experience, the ‘if-then’ structure which is so deeply rooted in the lived 
body. In good health, one acts in light of goals that relate to future possibilities (Toombs, 
1988, p. 212). In illness, and with the particular kind of disruption to the lived body that is 
characteristic of illness, one is restricted by their condition so that they become confined to 
the present, preoccupied with the demands of their current state. Toombs writes, ‘life projects 
must be abandoned, postponed or modified’ (ibid). In these conditions, the scope for goal-
directed anticipation is constricted as future possibilities seem beyond reach, and the 
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character of the future has been altered as a result of the change in the character of the 
present. All of this influences the way in which one exists in the world.  
The character of temporality is integral to an experience of bodily doubt. The experience of 
bodily doubt may be less pervasively world-altering where there is an understanding that 
one’s experience is temporary (Carel, 2013, p. 7). Longer lasting experience, or experiences 
that have an unpredictable duration, may involve a more severe case of bodily doubt, and 
therefore require adjustment to a more radical transformation of one’s existential orientation 
in the world that threatens to be permanent. 
In a case of common influenza, for example, the subject has an understanding that whatever 
the illness experience is like, it will not be this way for long, and one’s experience will soon 
return to normal. In other words, the timescale of such a disturbance is relatively predictable 
(Ratcliffe, 2013b, p. 213). In this sense, one’s habitual body, and in turn one’s orientation in a 
habitual world, is not compromised; the experienced changes are not such that they require 
any radical existential adjustment to. Whatever disruptions to the body are experienced, the 
subject’s relationship with their body is not questioned. Implicit in the subject’s existential 
orientation is the tacit sense that this illness experience is a period to be endured. This 
anticipatory structure is still intact; the subject here still exists in sight of the fulfilment of 
future possibilities, goals and commitments. Crudely, it is ‘put up with’, with faith in the 
relationship with one’s body remaining intact.  
By contrast, consider an illness that is phenomenally similar to common flu, but chronic. In a 
case of chronic fatigue syndrome, where the period of recovery from fatigue is long and slow, 
the subject’s faith in their relationship with their body can be thrust into the spotlight and 
challenged. One’s ability to easily and successfully undertake simple daily tasks becomes 
penetrated with a sense of doubt that transforms the subject’s orientation in the world.  
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This sort of change in existential orientation is characteristic of depression experience. On 
that line of thought, I propose that depression experience might be akin, at least 
phenomenologically, with chronic illness experience in that in both cases, in the face of 
pervasive shifts in one’s orientation in the world, one is vulnerable to the experience of a loss 
of the sense that there could be any meaningful change (Ratcliffe, 2015, p. 66). The 
phenomenology of pregnancy experience, in its potential similarity with the experience of a 
more chronic ‘somatic’ illness, might involve these same experiential changes that are 
associated with depression experience, or at the very least can be interpreted as being so. This 
is, I think, important when considering vulnerability to depression in subjects who have 
previously suffered, and who are therefore more vulnerable to experiences of depression in 
and after pregnancy. Though the pregnancy itself is understood to be temporary, with a fairly 
predictable timeline, women here may interpret the experienced shifts in orientation 
throughout pregnancy as threatening to be endless, thus restricting the possibility of 
meaningful change in a way that is phenomenologically alike depression experience. 
6. The self 
This threat of the endlessness of an experience of illness can have implications for the sense 
of self in at least two distinct but related ways. The first way in which I suggest that this can 
happen is through a sense of failure to engage in ‘me-projects’. This involves a disruption to 
the ordinarily presupposed set of capacities and commitments which the sense of the self 
incorporates.  
One’s sense of self might, though perhaps implicitly, include a set of activities in which one 
regularly engages, and an experience that prevents one from attending to such activities might 
lead to a sense of a compromised self. One, for example, might act in the world with an 
implicit sense of self that involves commitment to one’s career, regularly exercising or 
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socialising. A disruption to one’s ability to engage in such projects as part of an illness 
experience might be a source of distress that carries a sense of compromised selfhood; as 
Toombs writes, illness is not just a threat to the body, but is also a threat to the self in seeing 
oneself as ‘less of a person’ (Toombs, 1987, p. 230). Pregnancy experience, as well as post-
pregnancy, might be instances which can prevent one from engaging in the kind of activities 
discussed above that over time come to form part of the sense of self, resulting in one’s sense 
of self finding itself under threat, for example, a restricted work and or social life.  
I am proposing that, in a way similar to in illness, the experience of pregnancy and early 
motherhood might threaten to compromise a set of values which the subject ascribes to 
herself. For example, one’s self-ascription of the value of physical strength might find itself 
under threat in both pregnancy and illness when the subject finds themselves unable to carry 
out certain tasks. There is also surely something to be said about the influence of societal and 
medical conceptions of both pregnancy and illness here. The ill body is often equated with 
the inferior body, seen as a disabled body, or one requiring treatment. One might think that 
the experience of paternalistic medical attitudes might result in a similarly negatively 
impacted sense of self in pregnancy; indeed Young has suggested that internalising such 
attitudes might lead the pregnant woman to interpret such normal variations to her body as 
indications of weakness (Young, 2005, p. 57).  
Western cultural attitudes to female sexuality might produce a similar effect.  In the strict 
separation of pregnancy from sexuality, it is to be expected that the pregnant woman may 
experience her pregnant body as unattractive as a result of its exclusion from the kind of 
sexual ‘gaze’ that is ubiquitous in contemporary Western society, and consequently, for some 
women to various degrees, from the source of self-worth that has been reinforced since her 
adolescence. Conversely, though, Young has suggested that for some women, the pregnant 
body frees the woman from the relentless sexualisation of the female body in which she has 
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been immersed. Young describes this as the possibility of a release from an alienating gaze, 
allowing an ‘innocent narcissism’ (ibid, p. 53).  
In drastic shifts in experience sometimes associated with chronic illness experience or 
depression, one is faced with the threat that these shifts in experience represent their new 
orientation in the world that requires adjustment to. A constituent aspect of the experience of 
depression, for example, is a feeling that it will be endless, that there is no sense that the 
future offers anything different from what is currently experienced. In his discussion of the 
shifts in possibility space in depression, Ratcliffe writes that, in depression, the habitual, 
confident anticipation of significant possibilities is dissolved (2015, p.68). In other words, 
these experiences are no longer perceived as temporary changes that have struck the self, but 
as permanent changes to self and world, and so as integral to the self. With this can come 
ambiguity as to what experience can be attributable to one’s illness as opposed to part of the 
self, or perhaps more insidiously in experiences of depression, as part of the ‘real self’ which 
one is forced to confront. Recognition of this is valuable to my project as one might see a 
similar pattern in the pregnant woman, or new mother, who is experiencing a sense of a 
disrupted self in confrontation with intrusive thoughts. As Friedmann writes in her 
description of her experience of intrusive thoughts in early motherhood: 
 ‘…the thoughts running through our minds are compulsive and unrelentingly 
terrifying. I wonder how many women do realise that these thoughts are a symptom, 
though so insidious that they feel like us, our secret selves’ (Friedmann, 2017, p. 63) 
I suggest that obsessive, intrusive thoughts lend themselves to interpretation as integral to the 
self. That is in contrast to symptoms which are instead experienced as parasitic on the self24, 
                                                          
24 In similar context, Ratcliffe (2013b) describes influenza as a ‘foreign invader’ that inflicts symptoms on the 
sufferer from the outside, in contrast to typical depression narratives. 
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but not threatening it, such as the aforementioned bout of influenza that is relatively 
predictable. Intrusive thoughts are commonly experienced in pregnancy and early 
motherhood, though more severe in cases of depression or other episodes of mental ill-health. 
Fairbrother (2008) found that every woman in their sample (100 women) experienced some 
thoughts of harm to the new-born baby, with one in five of those women experiencing 
thoughts of intentional harm. Suffering from intrusive thoughts, one might struggle in 
attempts to ‘detach themselves’ from the experience as might be more straightforwardly done 
with an experience that was interpreted as being more obviously bodily, such as a pain. 
Intrusive thoughts are more likely to be experienced as ‘from within’, are more obviously 
part of one’s psychological life, concerned with one’s emotions, personality and values, as 
opposed to that which is understood to be a symptom of illness, experienced as something 
which attacks from the outside. 
7. Familiarity and interpretation 
In continuation of the discussion of the nature of temporality in illness above, the significance 
of the past can be understood as taking on a particularly intimidating character in illness such 
that the memory of a past experience of illness comes to be perceived as threatening 
(Toombs, 1988). Here, the past pervades the present, and one lives in fear of the reoccurrence 
of an experience of illness. Identifying oneself as vulnerable is key in influencing the 
subject’s interpretation of their experience.  
The interpretation of one’s experience plays a large part in the creation and maintenance of 
phenomenological changes. In illness, whether certain phenomenological changes are 
interpreted as attributable to the illness, and moreover, if so, whether they are attributable to 
somatic or psychiatric illness, carries particular weight. For pregnant women, it is important 
whether phenomenological changes are interpreted as attributable to a normal experience 
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characteristic of pregnancy, or an abnormal case of illness, somatic or psychiatric, i.e., where 
something has ‘gone wrong’. What is of particular importance here is the idea that the nature 
of the response to one’s state has power to influence it. On this line of thought, one can see 
how past experience of health problems may further increase vulnerability to depression-like 
experience in pregnancy, should normal changes characteristic of pregnancy be interpreted as 
signs that something has gone wrong again, due to phenomenological similarity between the 
normal pregnancy experience and a past experience of illness in which something was 
abnormal. 
Empirical study has shown that a previous history of depression is a strong predictor of 
subsequent postnatal depression (Beck, 2001), and a literature review on postnatal depression 
published by the World Health Organisation identified a history of depression as a strong risk 
factor for mothers (Stewart, 2003). Moreover, online fora frequently express pregnant 
women’s concerns about a history of depression making suffering from postnatal depression 
inevitable. These statistics are well-known, and an awareness of this risk itself can be a 
source of anxiety for women who identify themselves as vulnerable (Carel, 2017, p. 17).  
An anxious expectation that the kind of experience associated with some previous struggle 
with depression may resurface, sustains the inward, anxious focus on the body, and 
consequently, may have an influence on the way that the normal changes in pregnancy are 
experienced. In such cases, the ‘normal’ phenomenological changes characteristic of 
pregnancy may be interpreted as signs that something ‘isn’t quite right’.25 The elusive nature 
of these shifts in experience might contribute to the feeling that an episode of depression 
might be threatening to reoccur. For example, one pregnant woman on an internet forum 
described how the fear of intrusive thoughts, and of coming to lose touch with reality, has 
                                                          
25 This is reminiscent of Jaspers’ delusional atmosphere, to which an elusive ‘sense of unreality’ is integral 
(Stanghellini & Fuchs, 2013). 
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begun to make her feel ill. Reports like this illustrate the influence of anxiety about one’s 
condition over the nature of experience itself in the context of a pregnant woman, in which 
normal phenomenological changes in pregnancy might be interpreted differently once they 
are set in a particular psychological context, namely that in which the woman is, or considers 
herself to be, vulnerable to depression. Ratcliffe has suggested that a diagnosis of depression 
might dispose one to emphasise symptoms that can be more easily ignored when the 
phenomenological changes are attributable to influenza or some other infection (Ratcliffe, 
2013b, p. 207); conversely, I propose that a self-diagnosis of depression, or at least of 
experiencing depressive symptoms, might dispose the pregnant woman to amplify, and 
perceive as threatening, particular aspects of pregnancy experience that would not be 
considered threatening in the same way in a different psychological context, namely one that 
does not carry the threat of an episode of mental ill-health. One might then confuse ‘normal’ 
experience as being indicative of slipping into a depressive episode.  
It is easy to see how women with a past history of depressive experience might be particularly 
vulnerable to this. For such women, the phenomenology of that very slipping into a depressive 
episode may feel so familiar as to be indistinguishable from it. One might think that the kinds 
of experience characteristic of depression are particularly intelligible as such in certain 
contexts. The context of somatic illness is a good candidate for this, i.e. where the subject’s 
body is already ‘drained of its vitality’ (Ratcliffe, 2013b, p. 212). One might think that if the 
experience of pregnancy can be similar to an experience of somatic illness, then one is already 
in a context that makes depression experience more tangible. Moreover, if the woman in 
question, with a past history of depression, recognises the phenomena from a previous bout of 
depression, the psychological context of the experience becomes even more threatening. 
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8. Depersonalisation 
The study of depersonalisation is relevant to present purposes in two related ways. First, 
existing literature from the study of depersonalisation might provide another angle from 
which to look at the risk of depression experience in pregnancy. Second, a study of 
depersonalisation in relation to the phenomenology of pregnancy might help to illuminate the 
heterogeneity of depersonalisation experience.  
One might standardly describe depersonalisation as follows: 
‘…a pervasive and distressing feeling of estrangement…in which feelings of unreality 
and a loss of conviction of one’s own identity and of a sense of identification with and 
control over one’s body are the principal symptoms.’ 
(Noyes & Kolb, 1939/1964, p. 84) 
Phenomenological analyses of depersonalisation have so far attempted to illuminate the 
structure of the experience, typically as a symptom of depression or schizophrenia, through 
accounts of bodily feeling. Such accounts typically describe the sufferer’s loss of the feeling 
of the body as that through which the world is experienced. The breakdown of this 
transparency leads to an involuntary awareness of one’s body as a brute physical object, or 
Körper, where the physical, ‘thing-like’ properties of the body are involuntarily thrust into 
awareness (Ratcliffe, 2012a). This might be thought of as a breakdown in noetic bodily 
feeling, that is, feeling through the body, which gives rise to involuntary instances of 
noematic bodily feeling, that is, where the body itself is the object of awareness (Ratcliffe, 
2012a).  
Fuchs uses the term ‘corporealisation’ to describe the breakdown of the transparency of the 
lived body that is characteristic of a depersonalisation experience in depression. In this case, 
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the light, transparent body is transformed into a heavy physical object that becomes an 
obstacle to bodily intentionality. The physicality of the body that usually goes unnoticed, 
much like in the earlier description of bodily certainty, is now thrust into awareness and ‘felt 
painfully’ (Fuchs, 2005, p. 99). This change in the relationship with the body has also been 
associated with self-directed obsessional behaviours, principally compulsive rumination and 
self-scrutiny over one’s body; a sort of ‘exaggerated hyperawareness of one’s self’ (Simeon 
& Abugel, 2006, p. 62-3).  
So far these analyses have focused on depersonalisation experience in the context of a wider 
depression experience. There is high co-morbidity between depression and depersonalisation, 
although the causes and triggers of a depersonalisation episode are thought to be highly 
dynamic. Severe stress, episodes of other mental illness and childhood trauma have all been 
associated with the onset and severity of a depersonalisation experience (Simeon & Abugel 
2006, p. 103).26 
Strikingly, though, episodes of depersonalisation have been known to be triggered by 
‘joyous’ experience. Paradoxically, what seemed to throw one patient (with a very 
dysfunctional family life as a child) into bouts of depersonalisation was the promise of 
something exciting and positive about to happen in his life. Of course, what is overwhelming 
for one person may not be for the next, because what we experience is charged with unique 
personal meaning. So it seems that overwhelming experience of any kind can trigger chronic 
depersonalisation disorder in individuals who may be vulnerable to it (ibid. p. 95-6).  
Turning back to how I propose that this is relevant to the experience of pregnancy. The 
similarity between Young’s description of the change in her relationship with her body and 
the above discussion of depersonalisation disorder is immediately striking. Young described 
                                                          
26 Of course the influence of these factors is not unique to depersonalisation disorder. 
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her pregnant body as causing her to view herself as ‘herself and yet not herself’, where the 
experience of pregnancy reveals a body subjectivity that is ‘decentred’ and ‘myself in the 
mode of not being myself’ (Young, 2005, p. 46-9). Crucially though, for Young, this 
experience is not attributed any unpleasantness or suffering, and conversely, was described as 
an experience of empowerment and validation.  
Let us turn back to Young’s argument against the breakdown of noetic bodily feeling and the 
corresponding bodily transparency as necessitating ill-health. Young’s account of the changes 
to the experience of her body during pregnancy seem much akin to the descriptions of 
experience in depersonalisation disorder, only without any melancholic feeling or distress. 
From this, it seems that one can plausibly maintain either that pregnancy can be an instance 
where this breakdown of noetic bodily feeling is possible without distress, or that in such a 
case there is an extent to which one has not really lost grip of the former sense of the body as 
that through which the world is experienced in the same way. In both cases, we can still 
recognise that such an experience might become a source of distress as in standard 
conceptions of depersonalisation disorder in at least some women, dependent on their 
personal disposition. Recognition of this striking phenomenological similarity illuminates 
another angle from which we might make sense of depression-like experience in pregnancy 
and early motherhood.  
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Chapter 3  
Phenomenology and epistemic injustice 
1. The problem 
This chapter is concerned with highlighting the importance of recognition of the subjective 
dimension of experience through pregnancy and early motherhood, focusing on depressive 
experience through these periods in particular. It is true that contemporary healthcare practice 
more generally faces accusations of a lack of sensitivity to patient experience, with priority 
often given to the biological, third-person foundations of their condition. Initiatives in person-
centred medicine have attempted to remedy these shortcomings in medical attitudes 
(Mezzich, 2010, 2015). However, I argue that sensitivity to the phenomenological approach 
is essential for such initiatives to fulfil their potential. We do not necessarily need 
phenomenology in order to identify epistemic injustices but we may find it useful in our 
attempts to tackle them. A phenomenological investigation of pregnancy might allow us to 
better understand the experiences such that we can put ourselves in a better position to be 
able to mitigate the effects of epistemic injustices, for example in providing such women with 
the epistemic validation that they may lack.   
I am focusing here on the problem of inadequate sensitivity to the subjective experience of 
women in pregnancy and early motherhood in healthcare. From this, I will highlight the need 
for the adoption of the phenomenological stance (Ratcliffe, 2012c), both by the subject (i.e. 
the woman in question), and in interactions between the subject and others in appropriate 
relation to the subject. The adoption of the phenomenological stance in these ways, I argue, 
has great potential to improve self-understanding and resilience in women throughout 
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pregnancy and early motherhood, working to ameliorate some of the effects of the problems 
discussed.  
I will first look at the problem of epistemic injustice against ill persons in the clinical 
encounter (Fricker, 2007; Kidd & Carel, 2017), and show how in a similar way, injustices 
may be committed against pregnant women. I will then show how adopting the 
phenomenological stance can facilitate a richer understanding of the nature of women’s lived 
experience, and can therefore mitigate some of the effects of these injustices. I also explore 
how adopting a phenomenological approach might facilitate clarity of expression, allowing 
pre-reflective lived experience to come to the forefront of conscious thought, i.e., to become 
reflective. I argue this in support of the broader claim that a rich understanding of the 
experiences of pregnancy and early motherhood can serve as a therapeutic resource for the 
women in question.  
To begin, I will discuss some problems that result from the insensitivity to the nature of lived 
experience that is common in contemporary attitudes towards maternal health. The main 
culprit here is epistemic injustice in the clinical encounter. I will discuss various aspects of 
epistemic injustice in order to demonstrate how current attitudes can be detrimental to the 
well-being of women throughout pregnancy and early motherhood. 
2. The derivatised subject and testimonial injustice 
One notable way in which epistemic injustice might be committed against women in the 
clinical encounter is when the patient is treated as a derivatised subject, that is, a subject 
‘whose capacities are reduced to attending only to what stems from the others’ perspective’ 
(Kidd & Carel, 2017, p.107), or who is ‘relegated to the role of epistemic other, being treated 
as though the range of one’s subject capacities is merely derivative of another’s’ (Pohlhaus, 
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2013, p. 107).  In pregnancy the ‘derivatiser’ is usually the medical practitioner or healthcare 
professional.  
This is an aspect of the wider problem of testimonial injustice. In cases where the patient is 
treated as a derivatised subject, the patient’s testimony is only valued if it is of a certain 
nature, i.e., the type of information that she provides reflects what is understood to be part of 
the ‘dominantly experienced world’ (ibid). Factual information that fits within existing 
frameworks and medical practices is considered appropriate, and is therefore epistemically 
valuable, carrying sufficient weight to inform care. On the other hand, patient testimony that 
involves expressions of the private lived experience of one’s condition, in falling out of such 
frameworks, often goes unacknowledged. The subject in this case, in failing to be seen fully 
as a subject in a position of epistemic privilege, is not welcomed to contribute uniquely to the 
epistemic community in a way that might highlight the need to redirect practice (ibid). 
Testimony of this kind therefore systematically fails to be recognised as valuable in the 
clinical encounter.  
Testimonial injustices can also arise as a consequence of certain prejudices that are held 
against the subject, leading her to be perceived to be a less credible source of testimony than 
she would otherwise be. This has been described elsewhere as ‘credibility deficit’ (Fricker, 
2007, p. 17). I propose that pregnant women are particularly vulnerable to this in much the 
same way as the ill person. For example, the stereotypical description of the ill person as 
over-emotional, and therefore having a skewed perception of a situation, might affect the 
listener’s confidence in whether she is a reliable source of testimony about the nature of her 
experience, just as it would the pregnant woman. Take, for example, pregnant women’s 
testimony about their experience of pain. Such prejudices about pregnant women as 
overwhelmed by their situation and therefore unable to reliably report the level of pain that 
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they are experiencing might facilitate testimonial injustice in the form of not listening to the 
woman’s beliefs about the appropriate pain relief.  
Moreover, the historical inequality that women have faced regarding power relations is well-
documented, and is standardly articulated by those interested in epistemic injustice as a 
failure to be reciprocally recognised as epistemic peers, or as equal epistemic subjects. For 
pregnant women as victims of testimonial injustice, women’s descriptions of experiences of 
their bodies not being given adequate ‘status’ in the clinical encounter can result in the 
woman ceasing to feel as though she has epistemic privilege over herself and her body, and is 
therefore unable to properly exercise her agency, for example, in making choices about the 
nature of the birth. This ultimately threatens the relationship that women have with their 
bodies, which can result in a feeling of alienation from the self. 
Throughout clinical encounters in pregnancy, this sense of alienation might also be 
exacerbated by an uncomfortable transition from autonomous agent to patient, further 
removing the subject from the acknowledgement of herself as a subject, then coming to be 
conceived of as an ‘object’. Here women can come to depend upon third-person knowledge 
in order to understand and interpret their bodies under the feeling of pressure that they ought 
to defer to medical judgement in order to make sense of their experience. A change to (one’s 
relation to) one’s body is incredibly influential over one’s sense of self and the way that one 
exists in the world and with others, and it has even been suggested that this sense of 
alienation can hinder the mother’s ability to bond with her new baby (Freeman, 2014). Being 
subject to epistemic injustice in this way can foster compromised epistemic, and in turn 
social, confidence, resulting in one’s sense of being in the world, and being in the world with 
others, finding itself under threat.  
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3. Participatory prejudice 
There is a growing body of research evaluating the problem of ill persons being subject to 
participatory prejudices (Hookway, 2010; Kidd & Carel, 2017; Jackson, 2017). In the face of 
such prejudice, a subject’s participation in discussion about their condition is restricted by the 
nature of current medical attitudes and resources.27 For example, a patient’s participation in a 
discussion about their condition may involve just confirming basic biographical details or 
reporting symptoms, since they are not recognised as a subject with the capacity to redirect 
the discussion in an appropriate way. In the case of pregnancy, as in testimonial injustice, 
exposure to participatory prejudice can result in a woman’s description of the nature of her 
subjective experience not being considered clinically relevant. Descriptions of the woman’s 
subjective experience might include expressions of her sense of detachment from her body or 
the way in which her environment feels indescribably altered. Descriptions of this kind are 
often attributed little value in a medical context, for what action they ought to trigger is 
unclear. As a result, such existential changes that might accompany a woman’s experience 
are not recognised, and the woman’s experience is not ‘epistemically validated’ (Freeman, 
2014, p. 18). This felt absence of epistemic validation can create feelings of self-doubt, 
isolation and compromised autonomy.  
It is becoming increasingly well-documented that there is insufficient attention paid to 
maternal mental health in practitioner training, a consequence of this being that women are 
often not invited to discuss the intricacies of their experience.28 Just 39.7% of maternal 
support workers responding to a survey by the Royal College of Midwives (2014) reported 
                                                          
27 I specify medical attitudes and resources since I am concerned predominantly with the clinical encounter here. 
It should, however, be noted that there might be things to be said about epistemic injustice against pregnant 
women in the wider social community. This is also certainly true of illness; Jackson (2017) addresses this in the 
context of the social experience of depression. 
28 It is of course appropriate to note the very real impact of practical constraints; the nature of care that can be 
provided is restricted by time pressures that the vast majority of health workers face. 
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that they felt as though they have enough time to support women with their mental well-
being. One student midwife in the report suggested that women tend not do feel able to 
declare their low mood because time constraints that the midwives face make it difficult to 
create the appropriate environment for discussion. Such time pressures of course influence 
the type of discussion that midwives are able to facilitate.29 
Should the circumstances allow women to go into some detail about their experience, though, 
the practitioner’s lack of confidence in handling such information means that these 
descriptions are less likely to be given the appropriate status than they would be if sensitivity 
to such descriptions was better incorporated in training. In the same RCM report, 26.7% of 
third-year student midwives said they were not confident in their ability to recognise mental 
health issues in women, with 24.1% putting this down to insufficient theoretical knowledge 
in training. Some midwives have reported that they rely more on their own life experiences 
and intuitions than they do on their training in discussing mental health with women in their 
care (see McGlone et al, 2016). As it stands, with these deficiencies in sensitivity to maternal 
mental health in midwife training, the weight that the woman’s descriptions of her experience 
carry and the response the woman will receive depends largely on the personal dispositions of 
the maternal health worker in question. 
Women have reported that experiences of this kind, that is, the sorts of epistemic injustices 
detailed above, contributed directly to the creation and maintenance of their experiences of 
postnatal depression and related illnesses (see Boots Family Trust, 2013). We can remain 
confident that attention to how such aspects of experience might be approached in the clinical 
encounter remains important for protecting the well-being of the women in question. It is 
                                                          
29 This particular constraint is acknowledged to be a problem in medical care more widely (e.g. Kidd & Carel, 
2017, p.182). 
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essential, therefore, to develop an approach through which the negative effects of the clinical 
encounter can be alleviated.  
 
4. Hermeneutical injustice 
It is first worth highlighting the role that the collective lack of understanding plays in this 
reported feeling of marginalisation. The discussed epistemic injustices committed by 
individuals are constitutively related to a bigger, structural injustice: what Fricker calls 
hermeneutical injustice. Hermeneutical injustice arises when a group of people struggle to 
understand their experience because of some inadequacy in the resources that are required to 
understand them, resulting in a marginalisation of that group (Fricker, 2007, p. 153).  
It is easy to identify an inadequacy in resources for understanding reports of lived experience 
in maternal healthcare. Strikingly, a report by the Maternal Mental Health Alliance (MMHA) 
cited research showing that 23% of maternity professionals had received no education on 
maternal mental health (2013, p. 6). Low levels of confidence in dealing with mothers who 
expressed poor mental health were also identified in maternity professionals as a result of this 
lack of appropriate training. 
Importantly, hermeneutical injustice does not only affect the marginalised group in question, 
but it also negatively affects the ‘hermeneutically unjust group’, since this lack in resources 
results in a collective inadequacy of understanding. Both parties suffer from cognitive 
disablement, but the victim is prevented from understanding her own experience (Fricker, 
2007, p.151). Fricker has written that such disablement prevents the victim of the injustice 
from understanding ‘a patch of experience which it is strongly in her interests to understand, 
for without that understanding she is left troubled, confused, and isolated’ (ibid). Conversely, 
63 
 
the consequences of cognitive disablement for the ‘unjust group’ are clear to see in this 
particular context, as the quality of care that maternity professionals are equipped to carry out 
is negatively affected by the lack of appropriate resources for understanding that are provided 
in training. The same MMHA report also highlighted evidence that midwives have shown 
resistance against asking women about their mental health because they are concerned that 
they could discover issues that they would not know how to resolve. Of course, then, this 
perpetuates the injustices being committed against the women in question. 
Hermeneutical injustices can also play a role in the stigmatising of illness (Kidd & Carel, 
2017, p. 184). In the case of maternal mental health, it seems as though where frankness 
about potential mental distress has ‘no pay off’, since talking about them can be difficult and 
embarrassing, women are more likely to be dishonest about the way that they feel. There is 
evidence to show that embarrassment is the biggest obstacle for women feeling able to 
disclose information about their mental health with their midwife or health worker. Figure 1 
below charts this and other reported reasons for women not being fully honest about their 
mental health in conversation with midwives and health visitors: 
 
(Figure 1 - Data from Boots Family Trust, 2013) 
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The effects of epistemic injustice in maternal mental healthcare show themselves in the other 
documented reasons. The woman’s belief that the healthcare professional would not be able 
to help her speaks to the problems discussed earlier as a result of exposure to participatory 
prejudice: even if the information is offered, it may not be understood or accepted, nor is it 
guaranteed to trigger any positive action. There is little obvious up-side to volunteering 
information about such experiences where no positive action will be made.  
Both mothers and healthcare professionals have described discussions of mental health as 
something of a ‘tick-box exercise’, with criticism of health workers and midwives too heavily 
relying on the two Whooley questions, a closed-question screening resource (see McGlone et 
al, 2016). In interactions of this kind it is easy for women to ‘play down’ or lie about 
potentially distressing aspects of their experience in order to avoid anticipated complications. 
Moreover, this mutual reluctance to discuss the intricacies of the woman’s lived experience 
may also be related to the fear that disclosing a state of mind that might raise concerns of 
mental illness could trigger investigation from social services, potentially resulting in the 
removal of the baby from the mother’s care. Better resources for understanding experience 
might help to lessen the stigma surrounding mental ill-health, particularly in new mothers, 
allowing women to feel comfortable recognising and addressing the dynamic changes in 
experience that they face. 
Importantly here, such a high percentage of women putting their lack of honesty down to not 
having admitted to themselves that they were ill exposes the urgent need for resources for 
self-understanding throughout pregnancy (as in illness more generally): indeed there is a 
large volume of first-person reports suggesting that many women only become aware of the 
way that they felt retrospectively. More research into women’s experience in pregnancy and 
early motherhood is essential in order to change this. I will draw on this in the next section in 
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discussion of phenomenological self-reflection, in support of Kidd & Carel’s (2017) claim 
that offering new explanatory and ameliorative resources for ill persons is an essential task. 
5. Phenomenological self-reflection 
I propose here that the adoption of a phenomenological stance can facilitate understanding 
and interpretation of the lived experience of pregnancy and early motherhood. Though they 
come hand in hand with one another, I argue that the phenomenological stance has the 
potential to be beneficial in both independent self-reflection and in interaction with others.  
First, I will discuss how phenomenological self-reflection can provide a unique insight into 
the experience of this group of women, and suggest that such self-reflection might have 
therapeutic value. When taking part in phenomenological self-reflection, the subject is 
engaging in independent first-hand phenomenology. I acknowledge, however, that it is 
unrealistic to expect that everyone could or would want to engage in this way. With this in 
mind, I will then discuss foundational ways in which the phenomenological stance might be 
employed in what can be called cooperative phenomenology (see Spiegelberg, 1975, p.26), 
where others can engage with the methodology and the language of the phenomenological 
tradition to encourage first-hand phenomenological self-reflection in women.  
Recent work in various areas of applied phenomenology has stressed the value of 
phenomenological self-reflection for people with various anomalous experiences, and I argue 
that the value of this sort of phenomenological self-reflection extends to pregnancy and early 
motherhood.  Phenomenological self-reflection involves using oneself as an object of study, 
with the thought that attending to subtle shifts in one’s experience can disclose information 
about the wider structure of that experience. I am suggesting then, that for the women in 
question here, engaging in such reflection can provide a unique epistemic route to self-
knowledge (Freeman, 2014, p.4). Crucially, the sort of self-knowledge that can be revealed 
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through phenomenological self-reflection is that which cannot be accessed through the 
dominant third-person perspective, for example, knowledge about their experience of their 
bodies as mysterious or otherwise unpredictable, or how their interpretation of various 
phenomenological changes influences the way that they come to experience them.  
The primary way that one might engage in phenomenological self-reflection is through 
performance of the phenomenological reduction. The phenomenological reduction involves 
the bracketing of our familiar acceptance with the world and of ourselves as beings within it. 
In this particular case, the pregnant women in question would be invited to distance 
themselves from conventional, typically third-person understandings of pregnancy and 
maternal mental health, understandings which to an extent, women have become reliant on to 
interpret their experience. Engaging in the reduction allows one to distance oneself from 
dogmatic attitudes that come to form perception, redirecting focus onto the nature of being, 
rather than objective, naturalistic ideas about one’s experience that are without context.  
For the pregnant woman, this might involve bracketing information about, say, hormonal 
changes that are typical in pregnancy and their supposed influence on mood, and instead 
directing attention solely onto the way that the experience is given, potentially illuminating 
aspects of the experience that had previously gone unrecognised. Bracketing what 
understanding is facilitated through the dominance of the ‘natural attitude’ opens up a new 
way of experiencing, disclosing the experience’s structure and essential features (Carel, 2011, 
p. 10). In this sense, performance of the reduction provides some autonomy in light of the 
extent to which women’s understanding of their experience is influenced by the dominant 
naturalistic attitude outlined in the first chapter, the very concern raised in discussion of 
hermeneutical injustice.   
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A virtue of engaging in phenomenological self-reflection in this way is that it emphasises the 
meaningfulness of experience beyond the meanings generated by the natural attitude. Not 
unlike episodes of ill-health more generally, excessive rumination over one’s condition is 
common in women who are experiencing mental health problems throughout pregnancy and 
early motherhood (Alfaraj et al, 2009). Anomalous experience naturally forces us to reflect 
on our condition, and as Merleau-Ponty said, reflection ‘slackens the intentional threads 
which attach us to the world and thus bring them to our notice’ (1962, p.viii). I suggest that 
phenomenological self-reflection might help to provide autonomy for the pregnant woman, 
with which she can develop the epistemic confidence to reflect on her experience without the 
influence of the naturalistic attitude, and find meaning in her experience as it presents itself to 
her. 
Phenomenological self-reflection provides a framework for engaging with that which is 
brought to our attention. This is markedly different from encouraging simple ‘rumination’, 
characterised as persistent self-focused attention, which is thought to have an overall negative 
influence on mood (Alfaraj et al, 2009). In this case, attention is fixated in one direction, 
whereas as we established in chapter one, phenomenological self-reflection is not exclusively 
‘inwardly’ self-focused, but also world-focused, and promises to provide tools to be able to 
reflect in such a way that discloses hidden aspects of the whole of experience that the 
internalised natural attitude might work to suppress.  
As part of her work on phenomenology as a resource for patients of illness more generally, 
Carel outlines the content of a workshop focusing on phenomenological self-reflection in 
illness (2011). She proposes the use of visual and sensual samples, as well as discussion of 
phenomenological texts, intended to initiate such self-reflection. Much like what I am 
suggesting, this workshop on phenomenological self-reflection serves as a support tool for 
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patients in aiding them in their understanding of their condition as it is experienced by them, 
rather than as it is posited by the medical perspective.  
By no means is this the only way in which insights from phenomenology might be applied to 
a therapeutic context: phenomenological insights into the body and its relationship with affect 
have been used to develop dance and movement therapies for patients that focus on shifting 
attention to different aspects of experience (Koch, 2013). One way in which this is thought to 
aid understanding is by shifting attention towards preverbal responses and making them 
explicit, consequently bringing together pre-reflective experience with reflective experience 
to help form a more comprehensive picture of how experience is given.  
Moreover, in coming to recognise oneself as a being in the world, phenomenological self-
reflection highlights the importance of immersion in the world, something which simple 
rumination does not achieve. It is in this sense that phenomenological self-reflection does not 
just offer a framework for thought, but also for action. The proposition is not so radical as to 
suggest that the potential therapeutic value of the phenomenological approach is such that it 
will prevent anxiousness or the tendency to fret and so on. Rather, the thought is that it can 
provide a way of thinking about experience, as the women in question are disposed to do, that 
is useful, and indeed guiding, where standard episodes of rumination seem not to be. It is 
useful in emphasising the importance of recognising ourselves as beings in the world, and so 
crucially, in what follows, meaningfully recognising that our consciousness requires 
immersion in that world: “…it is not because I think being that I am certain of existing, but 
rather the certainty that I have of my thoughts derives from their actual existence.” (1962, 
p.402) 
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6. The role of others 
Carel has acknowledged that participants for the type of workshop she proposed are likely to 
be few and self-selecting (2011). The same concern applies to my proposition. How 
accessible is this material, and how realistic is it to expect that every new mother will want to 
or be able to engage in phenomenological self-reflection independently? I suggest that it is 
not necessarily just the subject who ought to engage in phenomenological methodology. 
There are ways in which interaction with others, through their engagement with 
phenomenological methodology, can facilitate the kind of phenomenological self-reflection 
discussed above. Engaging in phenomenological methodology need not be an isolating 
exercise, indeed it can be a cooperative one. It is worth noting at this point that I leave it open 
as to who exactly constitutes ‘the other’: as used here, the other could be anyone in 
appropriate relation to the woman in question, be that a partner, family member or healthcare 
practitioner.30 
The role of the other here can be to facilitate the woman’s engagement with 
phenomenological methodology by engaging in what might be called second-person 
phenomenology; that is, the other here adopts a phenomenological stance. The other engages 
with phenomenological methodology in order to disclose features of the woman’s experience 
that might be otherwise closed to her, in much the same way as in phenomenological self-
reflection. That this is possible rests upon the view that phenomenological reflection is 
initially uncommitted over whether it can be directed towards first-person or second-person 
experience (Ratcliffe, 2012c, p. 486). 
                                                          
30 On the same line of thought, I also do not wish to make too bold a claim on how exactly this might look in 
practical terms – that is beyond my remit here. Establishing phenomenology’s incorporation into the healthcare 
system requires both careful cultivation and interdisciplinary collaborative work. 
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Research that has been conducted on interviewing women from a feminist phenomenological 
perspective is a prime example of an adoption of the phenomenological stance whereby the 
other engages in second-person phenomenology in order to facilitate the employment of 
phenomenological methodology in the subject. For example, Louise Levesque-Lopman has 
conducted research to support the idea that interviewing women about their experiences from 
a feminist phenomenological perspective, that is, ‘starting from women’s experiences’, 
allows women to engage with the nature of their experience such that they are able to reveal 
to themselves their own insight into their lived experience, in their own words and from their 
own perspective (Levesque-Lopman, 2000, p. 103). The thought here is that in 
communicating one’s perspective to the phenomenological analyst, the subject is provided 
with novel insight into the structure of their experience, facilitating a unique extension of 
their own perspective (Spiegelberg, 1975, p. 123). This sort of phenomenological enquiry 
carried out with pregnant women, and the interpersonal relationship that is integral to such an 
enquiry, establishes a sort of mutuality between the woman and the other: this is an exercise 
in challenging the feeling of diminished epistemic privilege discussed earlier. When the 
woman begins to feel as though her lived experience is equally as valuable as, though of 
course different in kind to, the sort of third-person knowledge that tends to dominate, she and 
the other can become ‘epistemic peers’ (Freeman, 2012).  
The phenomenological stance provides a framework for a distinctive kind of access to the 
woman’s lived experience, facilitating what might be called radical empathy in the enquirer 
(Ratcliffe, 2012c). What is distinctive about radical empathy as opposed to typical 
understandings of empathy, is that it requires openness to reject presuppositions of aspects of 
what is perhaps implicitly thought to be part of the ‘shared world’, psychological context, or 
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backdrop against which experience is set.31 Typical understandings of empathy might suggest 
that one’s emotional state is felt by another as if through a sort of ‘contagion’, in which case, 
the emotional state perceived might just be carried over into the perceiver’s psychological 
context, with the same set of presuppositions and orientation in the world as before. Engaging 
in radical empathy requires a suspension of our habitual acceptance of the world in order to 
illuminate the possibility of a structurally different way of finding oneself in the world, with 
an openness to the degree of phenomenological difference that is possible between subjects.  
The concern may be raised here that in providing practitioners with this insight, there is a 
chance that the existing epistemic injustices might become deeper and more destructive. The 
worry might be that the nature of the patient’s subjective experience becomes another 
addition to the list of things which the practitioner has authority over, should they think that 
they are engaging in radical empathy with the subject. This is of course an important concern 
and something that, should this sort of thing be put in place, would require great care to 
protect against. Indeed this same issue stands with any professional with a duty of care, and 
so it does not seem to be a sufficient reason to warn against such initiatives. It would be 
dubious to suggest that since careless teaching could confuse and mislead students, teachers 
ought not to be given the power to teach; likewise with poor practice from a psychiatrist, GP 
or midwife. Rather, just like in all other cases, care is required to protect against this problem.  
Much like phenomenological self-reflection, this sort of phenomenological enquiry has 
therapeutic significance for the woman. The unique way in which the phenomenological 
stance, and importantly the language involved in it, can assist the enquirer, the other, in 
tapping in to the subjective dimension of the patient is a powerful tool for assisting their 
reconnection with others, and in turn, with themselves (Ratcliffe, 2012c, p. 474). This works 
                                                          
31 A similar process of engagement has elsewhere been called ‘imaginative self-transposal’, where 
phenomenology is said to be done through vicarious experience (see Spiegelberg, 1975, p.120). 
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to validate the first-person experience of the woman, providing the courage to address 
phenomenological changes and their significance without deferring to dominant naturalistic 
explanations. 
7. Language as transformative 
This leads me to defend the importance of the use of language in engaging in 
phenomenology, arguing for the position that the process of expressing one’s experience 
through language can transform the very experience expressed, and consequently, as above, 
facilitate self-understanding and resilience in the face of unique and potentially challenging 
shifts in experience. I am resisting the view that it is the case that a phenomenological insight 
into the nature of some experience must be able to be characterised verbally, but maintaining 
that there can be some unique value in doing so.  
Language can be a powerful tool for self-understanding. Expressing oneself through language 
can work to pre-reflective lived experience to the forefront of consciousness, i.e., make it 
reflective. It is worth noting that this is not to say that every use of self-expression through 
language has this transformative effect, since there are of course instances where language is 
used merely as a descriptive tool: if I describe what I had for lunch yesterday, then language 
here has served merely to report what I am probably already aware of. What is important is 
that self-expression through language has the potential to transform certain types of 
experience that might otherwise be elusive, namely here the types of experiences in 
pregnancy discussed in the previous chapter that naturalistic explanation excludes.  
How can self-expression through language make pre-reflective experience reflective? 
Expression through language can transform lived experience in that it can give pre-reflective 
experiences a new sense of precision (see James 1890, p. 254–5). What is crucial here is the 
recognition that an experience can be significant even if, because of its elusiveness, it feels 
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indistinct; that is to say that the ‘fuzziness’ of an experience ought not to be confused with its 
meaninglessness. A ‘fuzzy’ experience might be described as lacking what Colombetti has 
called ‘affective specificity’ (Colombetti, 2009, p. 8). For example, an experience of bodily 
doubt in pregnancy may not be such that one is able to distinguish it sufficiently to attribute it 
to any specific emotion, and so an affective experience of this kind might be pre-reflectively 
experienced merely as an detachment or anxiety, that is otherwise pre-reflective beyond 
vague terms like these. Expressing one’s experience through language here, for example in 
discussion of the lived body, its transparency, and the breakdown of that transparency, can 
act as a sort of lasso that works to establish the boundaries of an experience and make it less 
threatening. In this way, labelling one’s experience is a way of enhancing it so that it can be 
studied; by adopting a richer vocabulary for describing the nature of experience, the 
experience itself can be illuminated so that the subject is in a better position to navigate it. 
Much of the literature on affective enhancement through language is concerned with patients 
with abnormally limited emotional ranges such as patients with alexithymia, which has been 
described as a sort of ‘emotional blindness’, where the subject has extraordinary difficulty 
detecting their own emotion life. It might seem suspect to claim that the kind of affective 
experiences typical in people with, or susceptible to, mental ill-health in pregnancy, even 
with reports of ‘affective flattening’ common in depression, are instances of the same kind, 
and so warrant the same approach. One might similarly question the value in a methodology 
concerned with enhancing experience. Intuitively, it might seem as though in cases of say, 
anxiety, helplessness, or rumination, the goal ought to be to relieve whatever the feelings are 
that are associated with an experience, rather than to accentuate them as to examine them.  
I suggest that over-indulgence of this hesitation might handicap the ability to understand the 
complexity of one’s experience in such a way that may have a negative effect on self-
understanding and tools for future coping. Moreover, a failure to address the meaningfulness 
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of experience as it appears from the first-person perspective might also work to consolidate 
the sort of problem fostered by hermeneutical injustice, namely the belief that information 
about one’s condition is best informed by the naturalised, medical, third-person perspective. 
The ability to better express the nature of one’s experience allows a better understanding of 
the intricacies of the nature of those experiences, which equips us better to reflect on and 
navigate them. Hence, a richer vocabulary for expressing the nature of our experience is an 
essential task. 
A potential objection ought to be addressed here. One might think that trying to make sense 
of a complex experience through language might facilitate a distorted representation of the 
nature of the experience, since certain experiences are often thought to be beyond description, 
incapable of being fully accommodated by language. One might therefore think that language 
can in fact be an obstacle to reaching an authentic understanding of the nature of one’s 
experience. This view however, depends on the truth of the view that thought exists 
independently of language, and that we can engage in what might be called ‘pure thought’. I 
resist this in favour of the Merleau-Pontian view that thought does not exist independently of 
the world, and therefore of language. On this view, language, or (internal or external) speech, 
is a constituent part of the experience of thinking (1962, p.206). A thought truly independent 
of language is devoid of distinctive character, and is not much more than an urge or desire 
sunk into the unconscious. The view that thought exists independently of language, as 
Merleau-Ponty argues, rests upon the illusion of a silent inner life (1962, p.213). Our 
thoughts are in fact loaded with ‘inner language’ which we privately engage with, that 
provides our thoughts with their sense of determinacy. Language is already a constituent part 
of thought, and so an exercise in enriching our language as to enrich our thought seems a fine 
task.  
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In enriching our language to better reflect the nature of experience, we are equipping 
ourselves with resources to understand the way that experience directly presents itself to us. 
This, as I have shown, is particularly important for resilience in the face of anomalous 
experiences, throughout which the way that experience alters can be challenging, particularly 
for vulnerable individuals. The discussion of the forms of epistemic injustice committed 
against pregnant women and the motivations for ameliorating their effects that I have 
provided, should, I hope, make explicit the grounds on which the development of 
phenomenological resources promise to be valuable. This too, I hope, highlights the need for 
further research into the development of tools through which pregnant women’s experience 
can become epistemically validated. 
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Conclusion 
Here I have argued in favour of a formulation of phenomenology whereby we 
phenomenology is moderately naturalised in order to make phenomenologically-sensitive 
progress in the sciences, granted that some work is done to recharacterise what the natural 
scientist, specifically the psychiatrist, incorporates into his scope of concern. This perspective 
is open-minded to the idea of fruitful engagement between phenomenology and the natural 
sciences, yet still faithful to the spirit of the phenomenologist’s anti-naturalism, maintaining 
that ‘naturalistic explanations of human experience are impoverished, confused or – perhaps 
– both.’ (Ratcliffe, 2013a, p. 19) Working to address this allows us to create healthy projects 
in the sciences, and crucially, without having to be restricted to the sort of view that non-
naturalised phenomenological descriptions are consequently redundant. This position resists 
the view that third-person data has to check and justify first-person data (cf. Chalmers, 2004, 
p.16). Rather, we can still attend to phenomenological descriptions that the Dennettian might 
consider ‘fallible’, and consider them valuable and informative – since all that fallible means 
here is that they don’t map onto any existing, objectifying scientific explanation. We can be 
open to the incorporation of phenomenology into our scientific methodology, and preserve 
the idea that there is value in phenomenological descriptions themselves, independently of 
their naturalisation.  
I have also offered an account of the phenomenology of pregnancy and early motherhood, 
focusing on the risk of depression-like experience in certain women during this period. The 
account I offered builds upon existing research in the phenomenology of illness. Following a 
discussion about the nature of both illness and pregnancy, I work to illuminate the structure 
of pregnancy experience, investigating phenomenologically-rich similarities that can hold 
between pregnancy and illness, particularly depression. The focus of this chapter is the 
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proposal that the phenomenological approach (of the sort that I defended in chapter one) is a 
strong candidate for offering a uniquely rich understanding of the experience of pregnancy 
and early motherhood, and that this might provide a way in which women vulnerable to 
illness, particularly depression, might develop resilience. 
My final chapter illustrated how current attitudes in healthcare obstruct the sort of 
understanding of pregnancy and early motherhood that I introduced and celebrated in chapter 
two. My approach to this builds upon existing literature on epistemic injustice, and I suggest 
that such epistemic injustices are constitutively linked to the paradigmatic approach to the 
mind and brain that I discussed and resisted in chapter one. Crucially, this chapter offers a 
defence of how and why a phenomenologically-informed understanding might be beneficial, 
and therefore how the effects of the epistemic injustices discussed may be mitigated. My 
intention is to shed light on an avenue for further sensitive research in applied 
phenomenology that is concerned with the philosophy of pregnancy and early motherhood.  
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